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Rule One Podcast, Episode 1

The S&P500 Hasn't Seen This Since 1999.

, 82 min, with Austin, Travis and Hunter

In this episode we cover

  • Market concentration in 10 stocks
  • The rise of passive investing
  • AI and the chip cycle
  • Beware of investor hubris
  • Chipotle Nike Lululemon and Salesforce

Show notes

The market has never been this concentrated. A handful of AI-linked companies are carrying the S&P 500, valuations are near 1999 levels, and most of the money in the market is invested passively, with nobody checking price against value. Phil Town, Travis, Austin and Hunter talk through what could cause this to unwind, why the AI chip boom may follow the same boom-and-bust pattern as past chip cycles, and why owning an index fund isn’t as diversified as it sounds right now. They then look at Chipotle, Nike, Lululemon and Salesforce, great businesses the market has turned on, and ask whether their moats are still intact.

Resources from this episode

Transcript

Full text of the episode, on this page.

00:00

In my 40 years of investing, this

00:02

phenomenon is unprecedented and I feel

00:04

like I'm a little bit unmed like I'm I'm

00:07

in a big sea and the anchor broke. It's

00:11

not there anymore.

00:13

Hey everybody, how's it going? Uh

00:15

welcome to the Rule One podcast. This

00:17

week we have Phil Town with us. Uh the

00:20

Rule One investing guru and New York

00:22

Times bestselling author and all of our

00:25

boss uh Travis Parker, Austin Bowen, and

00:28

myself, Hunter Hoffler. all working uh

00:30

with Phil over here and between us we've

00:33

got a we've got a a few years of

00:36

experience. So this week we got a couple

00:38

interesting topics. Uh there's a couple

00:40

big names that are carrying the S&P 500

00:43

over the last roughly five or six years

00:45

now and some former compounders that

00:47

we're going to talk about that are kind

00:48

of struggling at the moment. So anyway,

00:50

yeah guys, let's just get started. Um

00:51

let's talk about what's going on in the

00:53

market. we have this kind of

00:54

unprecedented concentration of companies

00:57

that are driving all of these market

00:59

gains that we're seeing right now or at

01:01

the moment at least just propping the

01:02

market up. 10 stocks right now are

01:04

accounting for 60% of the market gains

01:06

this year. And uh that number in the

01:08

2010s was hovering at about 30% and

01:12

before that was a little closer to 20%

01:14

of the market being concentrated and

01:16

representing uh the top 10 companies

01:18

representing gains in the market. So,

01:21

I'll kick it off with Phil and we can

01:22

just uh we can just chat around the

01:24

table here about about what we think

01:25

about what's going on. And Phil, I'd

01:27

like to just ask you first. Um, you

01:29

know, have you ever seen such a

01:31

concentrated market like this? I mean,

01:33

you've got a lot more experience than us

01:35

and uh have have invested through

01:37

several cycles here. Is this something

01:39

novel to you or is there a is there a

01:41

time period where this type of thing was

01:44

happening and maybe some lessons that we

01:45

could pull from that?

01:46

I don't think I've ever seen it where

01:47

it's this concentrated. I mean it's

01:49

certainly you know the market goes on

01:50

its binges no question about it has the

01:52

internet binge just the same way you

01:54

know real estate it's its binge and

01:56

there's I guess a time and a place for

01:57

everything under heaven right but right

02:00

now it's just it seems to me so

02:02

concentrated in a way that I haven't

02:03

seen before and I think one of the one

02:05

of the really interesting phenomenon

02:07

from this and I'd love you guys to get

02:09

into the details about what you think

02:11

about individual companies in a minute

02:12

but I look at the Schiller PE ratio and

02:15

Wilshire GDP and I feel like I've been

02:17

launched to another planet where there's

02:20

a whole another set of rules going on

02:22

that haven't applied for oh 140 years

02:26

here and then the last 20 years it's

02:28

just these rules have blown up into a

02:31

situation where it's like you really

02:33

wonder if a guy like Warren Buffett

02:36

who's you know anchored on the idea that

02:39

the market's rational and always you

02:41

know ultimately prices things at their

02:43

value who's also sitting on 350400

02:46

billion dollars of cash. So, he's he's

02:48

not necessarily really buying into this

02:51

kind of valuation, but you kind of

02:53

wonder what he's thinking is like, is

02:55

there a new set of rules as a result of

02:57

AI that we didn't know about before and

03:00

that are permanent in some way that

03:03

result in a market average on the

03:06

Schiller PE of let's say 25 instead of

03:09

15. And if that's the case, then the

03:13

world has changed in an absolutely

03:16

unprecedented way. We've never seen this

03:19

before. Every time we see a cyclally

03:22

adjusted PE ratio that Robert Schiller

03:25

put together,

03:27

that's, you know, that's pushing over

03:29

into the 20s. You know, it the market

03:33

doesn't like it. And when it gets to 30,

03:35

there's always a market crash. 40, it's

03:37

a massive market crash. And we've been

03:40

we've been over 15 now for a long long

03:43

time. I don't know 15 years or something

03:45

where even the market crash didn't take

03:47

us below 15. So I honestly don't know in

03:51

my 40 years of investing

03:53

this phenomenon is unprecedented. And I

03:56

feel like I'm a little bit unmed like

03:58

I'm I'm in a big sea and the anchor

04:01

broke. It's not there anymore. And I,

04:04

you know, you just wonder, man, is this,

04:08

is this really permanent? And you've got

04:09

people out there who think it absolutely

04:11

is. The scary part is in 1999, I was

04:14

hearing the same thing. This is a

04:15

permanent change. Um, that the internet

04:19

has changed everything. And then, you

04:21

know, of course, we have the market drop

04:23

like a brick. So, honestly, I'm a little

04:26

out to see. And I've certainly been

04:28

investing like I've been out to see. am

04:29

sitting a lot of cash and just waiting

04:32

waiting waiting waiting for something

04:34

that hasn't happened. So, I'd love to

04:35

hear what you guys think. I mean, we're

04:37

going if if we're just looking at a

04:39

phenomenon that's not going to change

04:41

that from now on, you've got companies

04:43

that don't have they're really asset

04:46

light. They have very, you know, really

04:49

don't have to carry a lot of stuff or

04:51

replace it. And but at the same time,

04:53

they're dumping money into capex like

04:55

there's no tomorrow whatsoever. So, some

04:57

somebody explain that to me who's a

04:59

little smarter than I am.

05:01

Phil, you mentioned uh Buffett and

05:02

here's the question I think I'd like to

05:04

ask Buffett if I had an opportunity.

05:06

Okay. So, if you've got the S&P 500, you

05:09

know, he traditionally said if you don't

05:10

want to pick individual stocks, put your

05:12

money into the S&P 500 and let it ride,

05:14

right? But with what is it 41% of every

05:18

dollar sitting in 10 of 10 stocks, would

05:21

he still say that?

05:22

Yeah. Yeah. And you're at a you're at a

05:24

42 42 shiller.

05:26

42 shiller with a massive concentration.

05:29

230%

05:30

Wilshshire DDP. It's just like whoa.

05:33

Would you invest right now? Right.

05:35

Yeah. Because you're looking at 10 to 20

05:38

stocks that make up 50% of that index.

05:41

So it's not as if, you know, S&P 500 is

05:44

always sold as this. You're you're

05:46

automatically diversified into the 500

05:48

these 500 wonderful companies. I just

05:50

don't know if I wonder how you would

05:52

answer that question because if it was

05:53

me, I would I would tell people you need

05:55

to understand what you own. If you own

05:57

the S&P 500 index, you better understand

05:59

what companies are in there and you

06:01

better understand the top 20 because if

06:03

that's 50% of the index waiting, you

06:06

better be comfortable owning those

06:08

companies at massive valuations, uh

06:10

potentially massive valuations. So, that

06:13

would be the question I would love to

06:14

love to ask Warren and see what he would

06:16

respond now given the current

06:18

environment. I don't know what you guys

06:19

think about that, but

06:20

I mean I' I'd love to hear what you guys

06:22

think about what Lee Louu had to say,

06:25

right? You guys are really familiar with

06:27

him. And he pulled up, you know, the

06:29

chart from Jeremy Seagull that is

06:31

showing how if you invested in the stock

06:34

market over the last 200 years, you

06:35

would have made 2 million to one uh

06:39

relative to $1,800 in real terms, in

06:41

real buying power. Two two million to

06:43

one versus 2,000 to1 on bonds and like

06:46

4:1 on gold kind of things. So he took a

06:49

look at that chart and and he said that

06:51

yeah that's all true but who who's going

06:53

to be investing for 200 years? It's like

06:56

it it really depends on when you put

06:57

your money into this thing. And I mean

07:00

right to your point right he was showing

07:02

time periods where it's 10 years 15

07:04

years 20 years of absolutely sideways

07:07

after the market just explodes upward.

07:09

And you got to wonder is that where

07:10

we're headed for? And I mean, I've

07:13

[clears throat] got kids and they're

07:14

asking me what to do. And I'm like, God,

07:16

I I'll tell you, it's tough right now.

07:17

But I would just I would do bonds and

07:20

and cash and invest in options and I'd

07:23

do what we're doing and not chase this

07:25

market. I just don't believe that they

07:26

can keep going. But I don't know, man.

07:28

Maybe I'm wrong on this. I've tried to

07:30

do as much research as I can on this uh

07:32

particular topic, but I believe that

07:34

America is going through a first of its

07:36

kind in the entire history of investing

07:40

experiment right now. And this

07:42

experiment started in 1970 when Jack

07:45

Welsh created the index fund um and made

07:48

index fund and passive investing. And so

07:52

there's been a consistent growing creep

07:55

since it really took off 1978 when

07:58

Congress created the 401k. Um but is

08:01

then that has been growing to where in

08:03

1996

08:05

6% of the money in the stock market um

08:08

was was passive investing which mean

08:10

what and to just describe to people that

08:12

don't know what passive investing is. If

08:15

you have an IRA where automatically

08:17

every month you take let's say $500 out

08:21

of your paycheck and just put it into an

08:23

IRA and say invest it in the S&P 500.

08:26

That's passive investing. What you're

08:28

doing is doesn't matter. There's no

08:30

price discovery. You don't care about

08:32

price to value any of those things. It's

08:34

just money that's going into an index at

08:36

whatever the price is. Okay? versus

08:39

active investing is what we do where

08:42

we're basically looking at the price

08:44

versus the value of these these

08:45

companies out there, these businesses,

08:47

and we're saying, "Hey, this business is

08:48

overvalued. This business is

08:50

undervalued. This business is on sale."

08:51

All right? So, there's there's a big

08:52

difference. So, 6% in 1996 was passive

08:56

investing. By 2010,

08:58

um 2010, it was 19%. By 2015, 30% of the

09:04

equity or the money that was invested in

09:07

the US stock market in the global stock

09:08

market was was pass investing. That's

09:11

accelerated to 2023, 48% and now by the

09:15

end of 2024, 60% of the money, the total

09:19

money that's in the stock market is

09:21

passive investing money. And so the the

09:24

passive investing, just the automatic

09:27

put money out of your paycheck into the

09:29

market at any price, doesn't matter what

09:31

it is, is 60% now. And you know, you

09:34

look at these funds, it's like something

09:36

like I've got some stats here to just go

09:38

over, but um the baby boomer generation

09:41

controls 30% of the money in the stock

09:44

market through pension funds, 401ks, and

09:48

IAS, which is just an insane amount of

09:51

concentration in this retiring class of

09:53

of individuals. And once again, the this

09:56

is something that Bur's talked about in

09:58

a couple posts going back, I think on

09:59

his Substack, it's titled Foundations,

10:02

Foundations, Market Structure, and

10:04

Value. if anybody's subscribed and they

10:06

want to go read this. But what he's

10:08

basically saying is that this is like a

10:10

known issue in Congress where the

10:14

Congress has actually made a series of

10:16

changes to to push off required minimum

10:19

distributions for retirement accounts

10:21

because they're essentially trying to

10:23

keep the what they call the bid going

10:27

into the markets. And so what that means

10:30

is that every month you put money in,

10:33

but if you hit a certain age, it used to

10:35

be 70 and a half years old, you had to

10:37

you were required to pull money out of

10:39

your retirement accounts. Okay? And so

10:41

that's an ask, that's a selling action

10:43

that takes place. It was 70 and a half.

10:46

And then in 2008, they did the first

10:48

time ever, they basically waved all

10:50

requirement dist required RMDs. I'm just

10:53

call them RMDs from now on. 2008 2009

10:56

they waved all of them entirely and then

10:58

in 2019 as this baby boomer generation

11:01

was really starting to get in and RMDs

11:03

were starting to pick up. They passed in

11:05

2019 the secure act congress did which

11:08

pushed the age from 70 and a half to 72

11:11

pushing this thing off. Then in 2020

11:13

they passed the car's act which pushed

11:15

it further from 72 to 73. And so they're

11:19

just pushing off the age um of of how

11:21

long those it's set to go to 75 in 2035.

11:26

So they just keep extending this RMD

11:29

because if they didn't extend it right

11:31

now, so so the amount of flows of

11:34

boomers today that are currently

11:36

experiencing RMDs is about $250 billion

11:40

a year comes out versus all the money

11:42

that's coming in every year. If they

11:44

hadn't have changed that age to 73,

11:46

there'd be over a trillion dollars this

11:48

year that would be required to come out

11:51

of the market. And so this is the

11:53

government. They're saying it's because

11:54

people are are living longer. But, you

11:56

know, there's this other side of it

11:57

where it's like they're pushing off this

11:59

time bomb and passive investing. And the

12:01

other thing with that is passive

12:03

investing has taken over from pension

12:05

funds in a big way. So pension funds

12:07

used to be heavily bond, you know, or I

12:09

shouldn't say heavily, but they were a

12:11

mixture of equity and bonds. And as

12:13

money has flowed out of pension funds,

12:15

401ks and IAS have taken over, there's

12:17

been a decadel long trend of money

12:19

moving out of bonds and out of fixed

12:22

income and just into equities at any

12:24

price there is. And so, you know, I I

12:27

think that is the biggest force that's

12:28

driving the market. And when you put a

12:31

$100 into the S&P 500, you're you're you

12:34

might as well just put half of that into

12:36

the top 10 companies, the the mag seven

12:39

really, if you want to get, you know,

12:41

serious about it, which is extreme

12:43

concentration, no price discovery, and

12:46

all it's going to take is some type of

12:49

event. You know, CO looked like it might

12:51

start being that event, and the

12:53

government came in and printed $9

12:55

trillion to basically get us out of that

12:58

really quickly. It was 103 days from

13:01

start of the fall 34 37% down to getting

13:05

back to even which is really one of the

13:08

quickest bare markets we've ever had in

13:11

history. The average bare market lasts

13:13

411 days. So 103 days is just you know

13:16

25% of that. But there just going to

13:18

come this moment where we do have some

13:20

type of event that causes this. And all

13:22

it's going to take is baby boomer

13:24

regeneration to get nervous about being

13:26

in equities and want to switch to bonds.

13:28

And I think you could completely reset

13:31

the entire mechanics of passive

13:33

investing in equities off of that single

13:36

event. And I do think it could be rather

13:38

extreme more than more than we've really

13:40

ever seen just because there's been no

13:43

stock market equity market in history of

13:47

the entire world that has 60% of the

13:50

money passively investing with no price

13:52

discovery.

13:52

Yeah, that's that's a point that I was I

13:54

was going to hit on is that, you know,

13:56

it's one one thing we should keep in

13:58

mind the way that we invest. We're

14:00

typically pretty happy to carry a good

14:03

amount of cash on on our balance sheet

14:05

because we're waiting for these

14:06

opportunities where we can jump into the

14:08

market, but the rest of the market,

14:10

especially institutional money, does not

14:12

feel the same way. And typically that

14:15

money, if it's rotating out of stocks,

14:17

is going into bonds. And in the last,

14:20

you know, 20 years, save for the past

14:22

two years, rotating into bonds has not

14:25

been a very lucrative venture for sure.

14:28

Um, and the fact that all of this

14:30

passive money is staying in the equity

14:32

markets, uh, I it probably is due to the

14:35

fact that the bond market looks pretty

14:37

unappealing, especially in an

14:39

inflationary environment. You know, one

14:42

thing that I think is worth worth

14:43

flagging with all this concentration

14:45

right now, you were talking about

14:47

postco, the fact that we should have had

14:50

a correction there and there probably

14:51

should have been additional corrections

14:53

beyond COVID due to the fact that that

14:57

inflation was running pretty high. And I

14:59

in my opinion, I think the Fed was

15:01

pretty late to to raise the interest

15:04

rates and try and get some of that money

15:06

off the streets. Uh but instead what's

15:08

happened is that we the these two things

15:10

have kind of intersected at the perfect

15:12

point where we had a bunch of money you

15:14

know trillions of dollars injected into

15:16

the market over COVID and in the in the

15:19

years following COVID along with this

15:22

inflationary environment creating this

15:24

inflationary environment I could I

15:25

should say and then we have this

15:27

revolutionary

15:29

technology that is creating

15:30

unprecedented value in the market with

15:33

AI and all of we started off the

15:35

conversation talking about how the S&P

15:38

500 is so concentrated in these few tin

15:42

stocks, right? And it is all uh

15:45

hyperscalers and AI adjacent companies

15:48

that that the market has concentrated in

15:50

right now. In the past, that could have

15:52

been different industries, but right now

15:54

that's where all the money is. Those

15:56

businesses are creating insane value and

15:59

the money, the capital exists out there

16:01

to fund equities instead of flowing into

16:04

the bond market. So I I think that we're

16:06

at a little bit of an interesting, you

16:08

know, nexus right there with that. We

16:10

were talking about the Schiller PE

16:11

earlier as well, and the only other time

16:13

that you're seeing levels close to where

16:15

we're at right now was in 1999,

16:19

uh, in the dotcom boom and then the the

16:21

bursting of the dot bubble. Um and we

16:24

interestingly have kind of an interest

16:26

rate environment that was almost exactly

16:28

the same at the time coming down off of

16:31

really high highs um in in the 1970s and

16:35

80s. Uh where now the rates are roughly

16:38

the same, but we're in more of a an

16:40

inflationary environment where we're

16:41

more concerned about inflation and we're

16:43

more concerned over the long term that

16:45

rates are going to rise. You know, the

16:48

30-year Treasury rate, for example,

16:49

right now is, I think, pretty close to

16:50

6%. And I think uh in 1999, it averaged

16:54

out at about 5.8%. So, we're in a pretty

16:57

similar environment there.

16:58

Well, shoot, man. I' I'd like to know,

17:00

Trav, what do you think? You're you're

17:02

the valuation guy for these for these

17:05

more than I am for sure for these

17:07

hyperscalers. And one of the arguments

17:09

that we're not in a bubble is that the

17:12

hyperscalers are nothing like the 1999

17:15

internet bubble companies. That they're

17:18

making billions and billions of dollars.

17:20

They have tons of cash flow. Um these

17:23

are real companies that own their

17:25

markets. They're they're damn near

17:26

monopolies in their own areas. And we

17:30

and they're priced not crazy given given

17:34

that kind of cash flow. Well, I think I

17:36

think the argument is legitimate. I

17:38

mean, you listen to the other side. The

17:40

reason they'll support that argument is

17:41

they'll say that the demand for AI is

17:44

insatiable, right? That it's it's so

17:46

it's such a unique technology that

17:48

you're never going to have this period

17:50

where we're going to over, you know,

17:52

overbuild demand. But the problem I have

17:55

with that is that is that when I look at

17:57

the AI sector, to me, it looks very much

18:01

like a traditional chip cycle, right?

18:05

And the traditional chip cycle is

18:07

subjected to supply and demand

18:09

mismatches for a number of reasons. The

18:12

biggest one being that there's a massive

18:14

there's a massive differentiation

18:16

between when you can start building

18:19

added capacity and when it actually

18:20

comes online. So you're talking two to

18:22

three years before you you break ground

18:24

on the data center. Let's say three

18:26

years that it comes online. So in and

18:29

everybody's doing this. You've got, you

18:31

know, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and a

18:34

bunch of small players. You know, Meta

18:35

is in there as well. And a bunch of

18:37

small players doing it all at the same

18:39

time, chasing one single demand for AI.

18:43

That is a recipe, a huge recipe for a

18:47

massive supply and demand mismatch. As

18:49

we look at the cycle right now, AI is

18:52

being constrained by memory. And so

18:55

you're seeing people I I guarantee you

18:57

what's happening right now based on

18:59

experience from navigating the chip

19:01

cycle for years is that a lot of those

19:03

orders that these memory companies like

19:05

Micron are seeing are probably double

19:09

what they actually think they need. And

19:12

they're doing that because they know

19:14

that these companies are allocating

19:17

supply to them. They're they're trying

19:18

to spread a limited amount of supply

19:20

around. And if you're a buyer, you know

19:24

that if I'm getting a proportional

19:25

amount, I'm going to double my order so

19:27

I get what I actually need. And when the

19:30

music finally stops, when demand finally

19:33

starts to get satisfied, there's going

19:35

to be a whole bunch of what I believe

19:37

are going to be orders that were that

19:39

were phantom orders. And at the same

19:42

time, you'll start seeing all this

19:43

capacity from all these data centers

19:45

start to hit the market. And so I think

19:50

what we're going to see is at a minimum

19:53

at least a an orderly kind of a a

19:56

pullback in uh you know AI demand

20:00

because it'll be just a typical cycle.

20:02

We'll over supply the cycle the chips

20:03

will get cheap because inventory rise

20:06

once they bleed off the inventory of all

20:08

the chips and demand catches up the

20:11

cycle will start over. That's the best

20:13

case scenario. The worst case scenario

20:16

is that the demand comes in softer than

20:19

anybody imagined. And you see all the

20:22

hyperscalers, all they have to say is

20:24

one earnings call. All they have to say

20:25

is that, hey, we're pulling back on our

20:28

spending because we're worried about the

20:30

returns that we're going to get in the

20:33

future if we overbuild and everybody's

20:36

going to start selling instantly.

20:38

So I think that's the worst case

20:40

scenario. But at a minimum I see this

20:43

going into a typical two to threeyear

20:46

chip cycle kind of a trough and valley

20:49

with the trajectory will be up and to

20:51

the right. I think AI demand will

20:53

continue to grow. I just don't think the

20:56

dynamics of the AI chip and

20:58

infrastructure you know market is that

21:01

much different than a typical chip

21:02

cycle. So, I I think that there's a lot

21:04

of risk right here where we're at. And

21:07

more than ever, understanding price

21:09

versus value. What is what are those

21:11

chip companies actually worth long term

21:15

is critical. It's critical because

21:18

they're if you if you look back at the

21:20

was it the Nifty50 I think was uh was in

21:23

the 70s, right? Look at the Nifty50. All

21:27

the high growth stocks, you know, were

21:29

being bought up. And as soon as the

21:31

market crashed, I think in ' 74, all

21:33

those companies that were at the top of

21:35

the list that were I trading for like

21:38

200x earnings or something like that, it

21:40

took them 25 years. 25 years to catch

21:43

up. So this is this is why I think we

21:47

need to be really disciplined in terms

21:49

of understanding what you own. And yes,

21:51

these are great businesses with huge

21:53

cash flows, big moes,

21:55

but you can't pay an infinite price for

21:58

them, right? and and we're if we're

22:01

approaching even a top of cycle right

22:03

now, I think the best thing you can do

22:06

is just make sure you understand these

22:08

businesses and understand what the what

22:09

the value proposition is and and do a

22:12

proper valuation and be very patient

22:14

because if you buy them at the bottom of

22:16

a cycle, your returns could easily be

22:18

well over what we target at 26%. I think

22:22

you're you're looking at, you know,

22:23

stocks that will be able to compound

22:26

well into the next into the future for

22:27

the next 20 years, but you c you can't

22:30

buy them at the wrong time.

22:31

Yeah. I I mean, I just want to say that

22:33

um since Travis came on to the team with

22:37

Phil, I've I've watched and Phil Phil

22:39

and I, we've watched him correctly,

22:42

not call the absolute bottom, but

22:44

correctly call the bottoming of that

22:48

chip cycle back in 2018. again in 2022,

22:52

again in 2025. It's like, you know, in

22:55

2025, you were a little skeptical of it

22:57

just because of AI. You were like, "Hey,

22:59

there's a new factor in there that could

23:01

extend this." But, I mean, man, we that

23:04

turned out to be a a true, you know,

23:07

true bottom going forward. But, you

23:10

know, the fact that it's so predictable

23:12

for you, you know, really it's I put a

23:16

lot of faith that like you're you're

23:18

just seeing the number thing just so

23:20

people understand what Travis is saying.

23:21

Um, in in memory, so there's three big

23:24

memory makers in the world. You got

23:26

Micron, SKH, and Samsung. Um, in 2022,

23:30

2023, there was a bottoming of the

23:31

cycle. They pulled back on production.

23:33

They weren't spending and investing in

23:35

new fabs. Um, so there was a there's a

23:38

finite amount of memory in the world.

23:40

Well, fast forward to I think it was

23:42

August or September of 2025 when Oracle

23:45

and OpenAI inked the Stargate deal. Um,

23:48

OpenAI put in a letter of of commitment

23:51

to I think it was SKH Highix or Micron.

23:55

I I I I'm misremembering which one it

23:57

was, but it was for 9 900,000

24:01

memory wafers a month, which was at that

24:05

exact time 40%

24:07

of the world's memory supply in one one

24:12

commitment from a player that didn't

24:13

exist in the memory market, you know,

24:16

before that. And so that just created

24:18

this this huge, you know, all of a

24:20

sudden I think the biggest buyer of

24:23

memory in the world before that deal was

24:26

announced was Apple at 22% of the

24:28

market. You know, you've got the other

24:30

hyperscalers, Meta, Facebook, Google,

24:33

Amazon. They were all each around like

24:35

10 to 15% of the memory market. And so

24:38

here's one one purchase backed by

24:40

Oracle, backed by debt that previously

24:43

had never purchased any any memory that

24:45

says, "Hey, I want 40% of everything

24:47

that you can produce." And you can

24:50

imagine kind of what Travis was saying.

24:52

It's like now Google, Amazon, Facebook,

24:56

Meta, Microsoft, they all have to go,

24:59

well, I need I need some of that memory

25:01

for my own stuff. So they start

25:03

overordering on memory as well. And it

25:06

just creates this huge fight where

25:08

everybody's trying to get as much as

25:11

they can of a finite supply of memory

25:14

wafers in the world allocated to them on

25:17

their books and to do that like Travis

25:18

was saying they they over over orderer

25:21

and so I I don't Travis have you ever in

25:24

all your years and and have you ever

25:26

seen like such a supply demand mismatch

25:31

happen in the chip space because of of

25:33

one customer? No, I've I've never seen

25:35

it happen. In fact, memory, you know, 20

25:40

years ago, memory was such a commodity

25:42

that it it was cons, you know, we would

25:45

see supply and demand mismatches

25:47

happened, of course, but never at that

25:48

level of concentration. It was always

25:49

CPUs, right? CPUs were the where where

25:52

we would see these massive

25:53

concentrations where you had Intel, AMD

25:56

supplying almost every computer

25:59

manufacturer in the world. And so it

26:01

it's very different now. So, you know,

26:04

you mentioned that I did have, you know,

26:07

I did have some nervousness going into

26:09

this cycle because AI is very different.

26:11

So, what I want to acknowledge is that,

26:14

you know, the cycle could be different.

26:16

The the shape of the cycle, the duration

26:19

of the cycle, the magnitude of the

26:21

troughs and valleys could be very

26:22

different in the future because of AI. I

26:25

want to acknowledge that we may not see

26:27

the same amplitude at the top of a cycle

26:29

that we used to. It could be smoothed

26:31

out. And I think the reason that could

26:33

happen is that these long-term supply

26:36

agreements that you're talking about

26:38

actually guarantees some of these

26:40

companies at least some level of

26:41

predictability that I'm going to have

26:43

this at least minimum supply coming to

26:45

me and there's not going to be the

26:48

tendency to over orderer or to overbuild

26:52

um chips. So if if you're a fab if

26:55

you're a fab manager, okay? So if you um

26:58

are an Intel, say just pretend you're

27:00

Intel for a moment. You're talking about

27:03

a fab that costs billions of dollars.

27:06

And what you're measured on as a

27:09

production manager is you are measured

27:11

on cost per unit. And so as many units

27:14

as you can pump through that factory,

27:16

the better job you have just done,

27:19

right? because you'd spread all that

27:21

fixed cost over a number of units. So

27:24

these guys do not ever want to take

27:27

their foot off the gas. The moment they

27:29

take their foot off the gas and have to,

27:31

you know, reduce the number of wafer

27:33

starts, all of a sudden their cost just

27:35

went up. So not only do you have demand

27:38

games being played, you have supply, you

27:42

know, games being played. Um and and so

27:45

these guys I I used to push our

27:48

production lines to the limit. Like it

27:50

till the last possible moment I wasn't

27:52

going to turn off the spot, right?

27:55

So the the whole thing with these

27:58

long-term supply agreements is from a

28:00

fab manager's perspective now I have

28:02

some predictability and so the

28:04

likelihood that I'm going to overproduce

28:06

or produce more than I need to is great

28:09

greatly reduced. Right? It's a

28:11

significantly different picture.

28:14

But I don't hear anything in there that

28:15

stops the cycle from happening. I still

28:17

it whether the cycle is a softer cycle.

28:21

Um that's fine, but I still think you're

28:24

going to fall into that trap because I

28:26

don't believe AI demand I mean really

28:29

what you're talking about the demand is

28:30

information, right? Think of it like

28:33

from an oil and gas perspective. Um you

28:36

know it's rather than the flow of oil,

28:38

you're really managing the flow of

28:40

information. And so chips support that

28:42

either storage or transmission or

28:44

calculation of data. So

28:48

that that demand for data is continuing

28:51

to increase. But the dynamics of how the

28:54

market work I don't think have

28:56

fundamentally changed that much. So I

28:58

think that's where we could be wrong on

29:00

the cycle and that's what makes me

29:01

nervous about it. This cycle could last

29:03

a lot longer than we think. So it could

29:05

go into 2027 before we see it roll over.

29:08

What what I'm wondering is um about the

29:11

mismatch between the current chips which

29:14

are sitting in warehouses waiting for

29:16

data centers to be built that are in

29:19

turn waiting for environmental

29:22

um and social roadblocks to be taken

29:26

away. Um, I think Oracle just extended

29:29

its 2026

29:31

expected buildout to 2029

29:34

over a water issue and and this is going

29:37

on everywhere essentially. So, a a huge

29:40

percentage of the chips that have

29:41

already been built are from Nvidia are

29:44

sitting in warehouses right now and

29:45

they're not they're not installed

29:47

anywhere. And because they're not

29:49

installed anywhere, accounting rules say

29:52

that you don't depreciate those chips.

29:55

So no no no one at Google is writing

29:58

down uh the chips that are sitting in on

30:01

the warehouse floor. Okay. And now of

30:04

course Nvidia is coming out with this

30:05

new generation of chip which is I think

30:08

roughly five times faster than the

30:10

existing chips. And they are um about

30:14

oneten the energy usage which is

30:16

enormous change in in what you can do

30:19

with that chip or with that GPU. I guess

30:22

it's a GPU. So here's um here's a big

30:26

problem. If Nvidia is got a cycle of

30:28

about one one major

30:32

new chip per year and these guys are

30:35

building out data centers with a five

30:38

sixyear

30:39

expected life. Um first off I guess how

30:43

realistic is that sixyear life? Um and

30:47

and second, what happens if the

30:51

accountants finally can't stand it

30:53

anymore

30:55

that that they would be, you know,

30:57

actually criminally liable in some way

31:00

if they didn't write off chips that no

31:03

longer have the value that's being

31:04

carried on the books. So, I mean, if if

31:07

you've got a chip for $100 and it does

31:09

onetenth the energy and 5x the speed and

31:13

you bought a chip for $100 and says 10

31:16

times the energy and one the speed,

31:19

how is the accountant going to sit there

31:21

and say, "Oh, yeah, that's still worth

31:23

$100." It it just doesn't seem to me

31:25

it'd be possible. And at someday, I

31:28

would think that reckoning is going to

31:29

come. And but I don't I guess what I

31:32

don't know is how seriously will the

31:35

market take that? I mean it's a paper

31:37

write down. It comes against earnings,

31:40

right? For sure. I mean it comes against

31:41

earnings, but will the analysts just

31:44

talk around it? Will they just go blow

31:46

it off because it's not important and

31:48

yeah, you know, Google's earnings went

31:50

down by$50 billion that year, but who

31:52

cares? Or is this the straw that just

31:55

breaks the camel's back? Yeah, I think

31:57

there's a really interesting thing going

31:59

on right now in the market that a lot of

32:01

people are not willing to acknowledge,

32:04

but we've we've, you know, history

32:06

doesn't repeat, but it does rhyme. Um,

32:08

there's a really good book that anybody

32:10

that's interested in this stuff should

32:11

read called The Money Game, written in

32:13

1968. Um, and basically, it's a

32:16

non-fiction book, but the author, um,

32:19

Steve Olner, I think is his name. He um

32:23

he basically uses pseudonyms for people

32:26

on Wall Street that he was interacting

32:28

with at the time and um he one of the

32:31

characters in the book a Wall Street

32:33

person that he doesn't name he names him

32:34

Billy the kid in in the book he

32:37

basically says um there's this narrative

32:40

that the demand for computers so this is

32:42

1960s the demand for computers is

32:45

infinite right so it's like where have

32:48

we heard that demand is infinite it's

32:50

like that's just all the AI rage right

32:53

now. It was all the internet rage, you

32:55

know, and and we we do know factually

32:58

that there is not an infinite demand for

33:00

computers, you know, now that we're 60,

33:02

50, 60 years later. Um, but so demand

33:06

was infinite and so you could pay

33:08

whatever prices for computers back then

33:11

didn't matter and you could borrow

33:13

against them and everything because the

33:15

demand was just going to outpace and

33:16

they were going to have, you know, these

33:18

these useful lives. Back then they were

33:20

estimating that the useful life of a

33:22

computer was about 9 years give or take.

33:24

And I'm specifically referencing the the

33:26

IBM system 360 is is what's referenced

33:29

in the book. There was a really

33:30

interesting thing and that was that IBM

33:33

was constantly upping their next product

33:36

faster than every eight years because

33:38

they were trying to stay ahead. And so,

33:41

you know, even though a a 360 system

33:44

theoretically could last eight years

33:47

before it was basically non-functional

33:49

and chips do stop working over time, you

33:52

know, there there is a you know, the

33:54

heat that's in them and stuff like that,

33:55

pieces break, but if every one or two

33:58

years IBM was coming out with a new

34:00

system, it basically was obsoleting in a

34:03

much faster than eight years its

34:05

previous system. Okay. And the when the

34:08

370 came out two years later, um it

34:12

actually crashed the the average

34:14

computer stock crashed 80%.

34:17

Because most of these computer stocks

34:20

that were basically the equivalent today

34:22

is not, you know, Facebook Meta. It's

34:25

more of like your coreweave type

34:27

businesses where they're they're buying

34:29

GPUs and then renting them out. That's

34:30

what these companies are doing. So when

34:31

I say average computer stock, that's

34:33

what I mean is companies that were

34:34

buying IBM systems and then renting

34:36

those systems out. There was an 80%

34:39

correction in those those stocks because

34:41

they had bought these 8-year life

34:43

systems with debt and then there was a

34:45

two-year turnaround. What further

34:47

exasperated that is IBM had competition

34:50

and so they had huge margins because

34:52

they were kind of the first there. But

34:54

then on on one of their future systems,

34:57

they basically released a newer system

35:00

better than the 370, but dropped the

35:02

price of it 75% to compete with the

35:05

other big computer companies at the

35:07

time, you know, and and they had the

35:09

margin to do it. And so you look at

35:11

Nvidia today, they've got, I don't know,

35:14

80% gross margins, just absolutely

35:17

insane. People are saying demand for

35:19

GPUs is infinite. Okay, Nvidia is every

35:23

year now the the the cycles of them

35:26

releasing the next GPU are getting

35:28

shorter and shorter, but we do have this

35:30

one thing that's stopping kind of all of

35:33

the IBM piece from happening and that's

35:35

that Nvidia's newest systems that have

35:37

these leap the Vera Rubin that just have

35:40

these leapstep efficiency energy

35:42

efficiency gains um they can't be

35:44

installed yet because you can't install

35:47

a Vera Rubin in a yesterday's data

35:51

It's like yesterday's data centers are

35:53

entirely built up around air cooling.

35:55

And so the H100 chips, the B200 chips,

35:58

they can all go into those type of data

36:01

centers. But as soon as you get to these

36:03

latest and greatest Blackwell models and

36:06

the Vera Rubins, you need water cooling

36:08

installed. And so there's an entire just

36:11

gigantic industry like you were calling

36:13

out, Phil, of data centers that are

36:15

being up being built up right now that

36:17

need to be constructed before the new

36:21

chip that wipes out all the the value of

36:24

the previous chips comes out. And if we

36:26

overshoot demand even by a little bit,

36:31

you are going to see an unwinding of

36:33

these companies like Coreweave. Um

36:36

there's a couple others. There's a lot

36:37

of Bitcoin miners that became randomly

36:41

um AI data center companies. I think

36:43

that your your Metas, your Amazons, they

36:46

have such huge free cash flow from

36:49

exterior lines of business that they'll

36:51

get hit, but they're they're not going

36:53

to become worthless. It'll if if this

36:55

unwind does happen and it's because of a

36:58

supply demand mismatch as data center

37:00

capacity comes online with these newer

37:02

chips, they'll just be the unfortunate,

37:05

you know, we're taking earnings write

37:06

offs. They'll be the Cisco of of the

37:09

time where it was, you know, a couple

37:10

years of earnings write offs and, you

37:12

know, you just did a video on this

37:13

showing how Cisco was overpriced, but it

37:16

was a wonderful company. And so bad bad

37:18

investment at the peak didn't change the

37:21

fact that it was a cash flowing machine

37:23

for years and years after that. That's

37:25

those but your core weaves that took on

37:27

debt basically expecting these GPUs to

37:29

last and rent for a certain amount of

37:31

time. It's we were already seeing before

37:34

Opus dropped earlier this year. The

37:37

Bloomberg tracks these indexes of um the

37:41

the rental prices of these and the B200

37:45

which was released August of 2025

37:48

basically had a 20% drop in the rent by

37:51

January of 26. So the average rental

37:54

price of a B200 dropped 20% in 4 months

37:59

of being new and then Claude and Opus

38:03

took off. I mean Opus 4.6 6 Opus 4.7 all

38:07

this coding it took off. So that created

38:09

this huge demand surge for specifically

38:12

Anthropic but also codecs with OpenAI

38:15

and then you've got all these new chips

38:17

that cannot be installed yet waiting on

38:19

data centers. And so you know the B200s

38:21

are now renting at 150% of of what they

38:25

originally were. Not because the chips

38:28

last eight, not because the chips I

38:31

think in the long run are going to last

38:32

eight years, but because there's not a

38:34

newer chip. All the newer chips that are

38:37

being sold by Nvidia right now, Vera

38:38

Rubins and the latest and greatest of

38:40

Blackwells, they just can't be installed

38:42

and put into use yet. It's like 5% of

38:45

them have actually been installed in

38:47

data centers that have been sold.

38:48

Yeah. Uh, and I mean, I think you guys

38:50

have hit on on something interesting,

38:51

which is just the the social blowback

38:54

that you're getting from building new

38:55

data centers. Right now, I'm I'm living

38:58

in in kind of a uh a cultural epicenter

39:01

of this in Northern Virginia or one of

39:04

the main um one of the the main fiber

39:06

optic lines, transatlantic fiber optic

39:09

lines comes through Washington DC. So,

39:11

it's it's an area with a bunch of data

39:13

centers around us and always has been.

39:16

Um and there's a huge social backlash

39:18

because of a perceived increase in in

39:21

power. Uh there's more power outage.

39:24

There's a lot more priority in some

39:25

cases apparently being uh being given to

39:28

these data centers. Um so it might be

39:31

there might be a little bit more of a

39:33

barrier to entry to actually building

39:35

new data centers to use these new chips.

39:38

Uh I want to bring it back just to to

39:40

where where we started off here though

39:42

with with how the these this

39:45

concentration of of money in the indexes

39:48

uh with AI focused companies. I we've

39:52

talked about how we feel pretty

39:53

confident that there's a cycle here and

39:55

just want to bring it back to the fact

39:56

that because we feel like there's a chip

39:59

cycle and because there's such a high

40:01

concentration in companies that are

40:02

going to be directly affected by that. I

40:04

think that people should understand that

40:07

even even their their passive investment

40:09

accounts, their IAS and 401ks, you you

40:12

will see probably a larger effect on

40:14

those than a typical correction year in

40:17

in the chip cycle. So that's something

40:19

that we should we should pay attention

40:21

to. Uh if it's representing, you know,

40:23

close to 50% of these different index

40:26

funds um that that your passive

40:29

investments are going to be highly

40:30

concentrated in. if there's a correction

40:32

of 50%, you know, you should you should

40:35

feel like you're going to see a 20 to

40:36

25% correction in in your accounts. So,

40:40

that's something that uh that I just

40:41

wanted to highlight there. But, um

40:43

anything else on this, guys? I think we

40:44

should move on. Uh talk about some some

40:47

former compounders here that uh we've

40:49

taken a look at over our our careers and

40:52

and kind of how why they've fallen out

40:54

of favor. Phil, you got something? No,

40:56

just before you jump over, I I think you

40:58

were saying about a maybe a 25%

41:00

correction based on the math, but not I

41:03

don't think based on the emotion and on

41:05

the fact that these index funds have to

41:09

have to sell just like they have to buy.

41:12

They're passive and as the index goes

41:15

down,

41:16

they're liquidating to stay with it, I

41:19

believe. Wouldn't that be what happens?

41:21

Well, it would it would be baby boomers.

41:24

Think of think of 30% of the market

41:26

wanting to protect their what they need

41:30

in retirement. And so they sell just

41:34

passively. They say, "Hey, I want to go

41:36

to bonds instead of being in in

41:38

equities." And then there's a forced

41:40

selling that then probably gets

41:43

exacerbated by, you know, all these kind

41:46

of like computerbased algorithmic

41:48

tradings. the more it falls, the more

41:51

that baby boomer generation is going to

41:53

want to get to cash. People, people in,

41:56

you know, I would say like an average

41:57

millennial or gen Z, you know, you're

42:01

not going to have that same pressure of,

42:04

you know, this is what I have to live on

42:05

for the rest of my life. And so, you

42:08

know, they might react the same. they

42:09

might get pressured all the same, but

42:11

specifically remember 30% of all the

42:15

money in the market today is passively

42:18

invested by a retiring generation. All

42:21

right? And so it could get really really

42:24

violent.

42:25

I just want to add one more one more

42:27

thing to that point and that is that

42:29

there's this isn't a coincidence that

42:32

all of this has been generated since the

42:34

1970s. The baby boom generation is the

42:37

biggest generation in history of the

42:38

country and came into their adulthood in

42:42

the 1970s and begin and had started to

42:45

see that a defined benefit plan wasn't

42:50

um producing much of a of a good

42:53

retirement and that if you put your

42:55

money in the stock market in the 401k

42:57

plan which which didn't exist right um

43:01

that would have been better in other

43:03

words to control more your your future

43:05

future and to have a better return. And

43:07

so the 401k plans were pushed for it in

43:09

Congress and created in the late 1970s.

43:12

And then that started driving this

43:14

train. More and more and more money goes

43:18

into the stock market. And as it does,

43:20

the stock market goes up over time being

43:23

driven by more and more money being put

43:25

in it. And you you can just imagine

43:28

these the the baby boom generation now

43:31

in their late 60s, early 70s

43:35

not

43:36

um not wanting to be in a position of

43:39

having to go to work for Walmart in

43:41

their 70s or 80s and seeing bonds a

43:45

10-year bond at 6% and maybe higher.

43:49

Just historically, it wouldn't be crazy

43:51

at all to see a tenure at 7% 8%. So, if

43:55

you get bonds up into that range, which

43:58

is a pretty decent return,

44:01

you'll have annuities

44:03

screaming, "Come and buy me because I

44:06

can give you 10 or 12, right? The way

44:08

annuities work it out." And so you have

44:11

these options that baby boomers haven't

44:13

had for decade a couple of decades where

44:15

all of a sudden you can shift all of

44:17

that retirement capital to annuities and

44:20

bet the farm that you're going to live a

44:21

long time and if you do you're going to

44:23

make this great return or just go over

44:25

to bonds and be happy with a 6% return

44:29

rather than having a negative return in

44:32

the market and a flatline return for 10

44:35

years. You can really see people wanting

44:38

to shift and and doing so in large

44:42

numbers, which then means this whole

44:44

market goes down a lot more than 25%.

44:47

This market starts to tumble and first

44:51

the baby boomers make it tumble and then

44:53

Austin, to your point, then the rest of

44:56

the generations are like, "What am I

44:59

doing in here?" you know, and and bail

45:02

out. And that can take this thing into a

45:05

contagion that we've never seen before

45:07

because of of we've never seen this

45:10

level of passive investing. So, it it

45:13

could be really entertaining if if

45:15

you're sitting on the sidelines or if

45:16

you have uh some skill at making money

45:19

when the markets go down, um this could

45:22

be really really a great market for you.

45:25

Um, but if you're sitting there hoping

45:29

against all history that the stock

45:32

market continues to produce double-digit

45:34

returns

45:36

into the future without a major break,

45:40

uh, that would be, I think, a hope

45:42

overexperience.

45:43

Yeah, it's kind of I feel like it's the

45:45

illusion of safety, right? You've got

45:47

this massive concentration in 20 stocks

45:50

and the S&P 500 and the passive flows

45:52

that Awesome was talking about. To me,

45:55

this is this is the time now more than

45:57

ever you need to be able to understand

45:59

individual companies, right? Th this is

46:02

the time and you need to understand how

46:03

to pick a business that has a moat and

46:07

has long-term ability to um to compound

46:11

money into the future because you cannot

46:14

simply put your money in an index and

46:16

feel safe. That traditional wisdom I

46:18

think is is out the window right now

46:21

because to your guys's point when it

46:23

unwinds there's going to be a lot of

46:24

pain out there. So understanding

46:27

individual companies now I think is more

46:29

important than ever in my view.

46:30

Yeah. Just for the viewers, just just

46:32

for the viewers, we're not saying it's

46:33

going to unwind this year either. It's

46:35

like we don't know when it's going to

46:36

unwind. The longer it goes, the bigger

46:39

the unwind. That's what we do know.

46:41

I I will say Warren Buffett came out in

46:43

July in an interview with Becky Quick

46:45

and basically said, "Yeah, it will

46:46

happen. [laughter]

46:49

I mean, it's going to happen." That

46:50

I mean, it's, you know, you keep saying

46:52

it long enough, you're going to be

46:54

right. And uh I think that the odds are

46:56

getting higher and higher. And one of my

46:58

friends was like, "Yeah, yeah, and a

46:59

stopped watch is right twice a day,

47:01

buddy."

47:02

Yeah. Oh, God. Did not mean that as a

47:04

shot towards Warren Buffett.

47:06

I I I would I would just say though to

47:08

that point, if you're right once or

47:11

twice in your entire life, it can change

47:13

your entire financial future. So it's

47:16

like you can be wrong for a decade or

47:19

two and just getting in just being

47:22

patient and waiting for the right moment

47:25

in in a lifetime can be the difference

47:27

of having a little bit to retire on and

47:30

having you know more than you need to

47:31

retire on to the point where your kids

47:33

have enough to retire on just from you.

47:36

That's the beauty of what we're doing,

47:38

right? If you understand the difference

47:39

between price and value, you're you're

47:42

going to naturally be in a position

47:44

hopefully, right, where you're not

47:45

sitting on a bunch of overvalued

47:47

companies when if and when we're

47:48

ultimately right. Right? That's the key.

47:51

And that's all you have to worry about.

47:52

You don't have to know when it's going

47:54

to happen. All you have to do is make

47:55

sure your money is put into companies

47:57

that are long-term compounding machines

47:59

or just wonderful businesses at fair

48:02

prices, even fair prices. And that's all

48:05

you have to do. You don't have to figure

48:06

out when it's going to happen. I I I

48:08

laugh all the time. I I read Phil's book

48:10

in 2009. My dad gave it to me in 2009,

48:13

okay? Rule on investing. And I read it,

48:16

did a little paper trading, you know,

48:18

following the rule and invest stuff. And

48:19

my first stock purchase, me and my dad

48:21

were 2010. We just thought we were good

48:25

because we went like six years without a

48:28

single losing investment with just

48:30

skyrocketing investment returns. you

48:33

know, I was starting from a a low base,

48:35

but you know, I I didn't I didn't have a

48:37

loss in six years. I just thought I was

48:39

an amazing investor and I didn't

48:40

understand that that timing piece was

48:43

masking, you know, completely what was,

48:46

you know, my my amateur investing. You

48:49

know, it's I I think back to what I know

48:51

then versus what I know now. And if I

48:53

was coming in, if I was coming into the

48:56

world as a as a 19, no, as an

49:00

18-year-old today

49:03

trying to trying to have those kind, it

49:05

would be extremely hard to have that

49:09

that next six years clarity. It's I

49:12

would probably have a much different

49:14

look if I if id started in 2006 or 2007.

49:17

I probably wouldn't have been an

49:18

investor. I probably would have never,

49:21

you know, picked it up and done this.

49:22

And so, a little bit of timing was what

49:24

got me so hooked that I just couldn't

49:27

put it down. And that was just a a a

49:30

timing of of deciding to invest at

49:32

probably the best time to try in the

49:34

past 100 years of the stock market since

49:37

like 1933.

49:39

Well, it's and it's also puts you in

49:42

danger of a little bit of hubris, too,

49:43

right?

49:44

Oh, yeah. It it caught up with me.

49:46

I hear you. Uh Austin has there's none

49:49

of that in Austin. No humorus.

49:51

No, but I mean see ser see like we run

49:53

into this all the time, right? When when

49:54

we're when we're back testing trades,

49:56

right? It is so important that where you

49:59

start your back test can make or break

50:02

the the viability of of a trade, right?

50:05

So, I mean, it's something that you have

50:06

to keep in keep in mind, paying

50:08

attention to when you're in the market,

50:11

how you're performing, and uh and

50:13

building trades based on uh based on the

50:17

fundamental value of a business, not the

50:19

uh not the price at the time. So,

50:21

speaking of stock prices,

50:23

wait, wait, wait. I want to second the

50:24

hubris thing. The hubris thing is huge.

50:28

Thank you, Austin, for bringing that up.

50:31

I mean, it's so gigantic. it because

50:34

particularly if you're new to this that

50:36

for some reason if you're well not just

50:38

for some reason typically if you're new

50:40

to this you haven't suffered any losses

50:44

and you're going along maybe you're

50:46

doing paper trading or something and

50:47

things are going well so you're

50:48

continuing along and you sort of build

50:50

up this sense that you really can do

50:52

this really well and I had the exact

50:54

same experience I started investing in

50:57

1981

50:59

and the market was at like 700 or

51:01

something. It was at the bottom. I mean,

51:04

Bear Sterns in told me, "Oh, no. I mean,

51:07

you can't you can't raise money for

51:09

stock investing anymore. It's over." You

51:11

know, I mean, it had been since 1965,

51:14

the market was at a thousand. And here

51:16

we are at 1981. It's at 600. So, 18

51:20

years later, people are like, I'm done

51:22

with the stock market. It's stupid. And

51:25

that was the perfect time to start

51:27

investing, right? And I had the same

51:29

experience. year after year of

51:31

brilliant, brilliant investing. It was

51:33

just brilliant.

51:35

Everything just went straight up,

51:38

right? So, beware of hubris. It will

51:41

bite you in the butt for sure. And it's

51:44

really just that sense that you know

51:46

more than you really do. And uh and you

51:49

got to you just got to stay humble, man.

51:50

That's what you got to do. Stay humble.

51:52

Speaking speaking of hubris, uh we got a

51:55

couple companies here that have made

51:57

some some follyies and a couple of

51:59

companies here we're looking at that uh

52:01

are just caught up in kind of a bad

52:03

narrative uh in the market right now

52:06

that were former what we would call

52:08

compounders that as of late in the last

52:11

couple of years have uh not performed so

52:13

well or just have fallen out of favor uh

52:16

in the market. And those companies that

52:18

we'll discuss here real quick are

52:20

Chipotle, Nike, and Salesforce. Um, so

52:24

why don't we start with with Chipotle

52:26

that is down uh about 40% from its highs

52:30

in 2024. Um, and is uh has has had a

52:34

little bit of uh struggle with foot

52:36

traffic uh forecasting very little sales

52:39

growth. um in a company that we really

52:42

love that has a great product has

52:43

generally had good management and a

52:46

really good structure. So um I mean

52:48

let's just let's start there and talk a

52:50

little bit about where the consumers at

52:53

and uh and what is going on with

52:56

Chipotle and what we think they need to

52:57

do to get back on track.

52:58

Yeah, I thought this when I was looking

53:00

at this before the before the show here,

53:03

the the analogy that came to mind was

53:05

it's like you would drive by Chipotle

53:07

and there'd be a line out the door,

53:09

right?

53:10

And now you drive by Chipotle and

53:13

there's open tables at lunch and you're

53:16

like what what's going on? Is is the

53:19

question is are the customers short on

53:20

money and you know so the value wars

53:23

have started or have people found a new

53:26

favorite spot and Chipotle's moat is is

53:29

eroding right that's like the key

53:30

question to me I think I think the if I

53:33

remember right it was the first annual

53:37

same store sales decline since 2016 so

53:41

this is a huge slowdown right for them

53:43

it's I think it was like 4% comps are

53:45

down 4% Um but they you know they they

53:49

did grow their revenue slightly and then

53:51

the stock you know was down like 26%

53:54

over this last year and they just went

53:57

through a leadership change right uh

53:59

Brian Nicole left and uh I think it it's

54:01

uh Scott Boatright is that right Austin

54:03

I think Scott Boight's the guy um but

54:06

you know I look at I look at Chipotle

54:08

and I'm you know they still have like

54:10

21% ROIC

54:12

um they're still making like 1.5 billion

54:15

in free cash flow a here. They just

54:18

passed 4,000 locations, I think, um,

54:21

recently, and I think they've got a plan

54:23

to go to 7,000.

54:25

And I'm I'm and I think they're even

54:28

starting to think about some

54:28

international expansion. So, you know, I

54:31

I look at this on the surface and and it

54:33

to me it's still a great business

54:35

producing a lot of free cash flow. Sure,

54:38

they probably have some more competition

54:39

coming in, but I think this is actually

54:42

a sign of how much stress the consumer

54:45

is under and less about the long-term

54:47

prospects for the company. Um, I I don't

54:50

think that Chipotle is seeing an erosion

54:53

of their moat. I think they might be

54:55

dealing with competition and I think

54:56

they're dealing with pricing pressure

54:58

and a fickle consumer, but I don't

55:01

believe that that Chipotle is all of a

55:04

sudden uh just all of a sudden lost

55:07

their their moat and competitive

55:09

advantage at this stage. I really think

55:10

this is a very temporary um kind of a

55:13

slowdown in their business and we're

55:15

benefiting from Wall Street

55:18

looking at a very short term thinking,

55:21

oh their comp sales are down and traffic

55:23

is lower. Wow, this business is broken

55:26

and it's broken forever. Let's sell it.

55:29

Right? This is this is exactly the kind

55:31

of opportunity

55:32

that that gets us really interested.

55:35

Right? So the question is is the remote

55:38

intact? And I guess that's the question

55:39

I would pass back to you guys. Is the

55:41

moat broken or is it not broken? On the

55:44

surface, it still looks like it's intact

55:45

to me.

55:46

So, I think there's two big forces right

55:48

now. Well, let's let's go three big

55:49

forces right now that are affecting a

55:51

lot of stocks in Chipotle falls into

55:53

this bucket. But, um, you know, when we

55:55

look at events that are taking place

55:58

with a company, why it's down, you can

56:00

have an event where there's a um, let's

56:03

call it an industry specific, a company

56:05

specific, or a macro event. And so if we

56:07

look at an industry specific event

56:10

that's going on right now, we're uh

56:11

about 18 months into the GLP 1, 2, and 3

56:16

kind of craze that's been going across

56:17

America. People are just eating less

56:20

food. Uh and Chipotle has held up pretty

56:23

resilient to that because when you go to

56:25

your doctor and get on these drugs, they

56:27

basically tell you, hey, you need to

56:29

maintain your protein uptake. And it's

56:31

like I did an experiment with the GLP1s,

56:34

you know, just to find out what it was

56:36

like. I had a bunch of friends that were

56:38

doing it and, you know, I hated it. It

56:40

was it was you just basically withered

56:42

away because you didn't eat anything.

56:44

Um, the GLP3,

56:46

you know, look at me, guys. I'm hitting

56:48

my I'm almost to my midlife, you know,

56:51

putting on putting on the weight.

56:53

I'm I'm just experimenting with the

56:55

GLP1s. I don't need it, though. It was

56:57

completely for research purposes. I'll

57:00

just tell you guys, he's let himself go

57:01

a little bit since I since I first

57:03

started working with them. [laughter]

57:05

Travis and I haven't we have we have

57:07

ongoing workout competitions, which is

57:09

honestly it's it's pretty shameful for

57:11

me. The fact that I can't beat him in

57:12

every workout um there is. Anyway, so I

57:15

think that's one thing that's affecting

57:17

Let's get back to this. I think that's

57:18

one thing that's affecting the whole

57:19

restaurant industry is is and and really

57:21

the whole grocery industry. We're

57:23

seeing, you know, I'm seeing uh protein

57:25

pasta now because it's like everybody is

57:28

trying to evolve their product. Chipotle

57:30

obviously has these like really healthy

57:31

organic bowls, chicken, beef, pork, you

57:35

you name it. It's like they're they're

57:37

set up to to do well in this space

57:40

despite the fact that there's a a

57:42

slowdown in just how much calories

57:44

people in the US and across the world

57:46

are eating. But we'll just talk about

57:47

the US because Chipotle is a US company

57:49

and it's it's its locations are almost

57:51

exclusively in the US. Second thing that

57:53

you've got going on right now which

57:55

nobody wants to acknowledge um is that

57:58

there is a consumer slowdown happening

58:00

across every consumer discretionary and

58:03

non-discretionary category. It's like

58:05

it's not just Chipotle that's

58:07

experiencing their their you know first

58:10

same store sales quarter of of growth.

58:13

Walmart just had their first quarter in

58:16

I I don't even know how many years. It's

58:19

probably like over a decade of quarterly

58:21

same store sales growth. They just

58:23

experienced their first quarter of I I

58:25

don't know if it was a full-on um

58:27

negative growth, but I think it was a a

58:29

really heavy deceleration. And Walmart

58:32

is sitting at the the lowest price

58:34

point. They should theoretically be the

58:36

last ones to to feel that pressure. Um

58:40

Target, same thing. Kroger is reducing

58:43

prices, cutting into their margins,

58:45

trying to keep the basket items up. So,

58:47

this is this is not a Chipotle specific

58:50

thing. This is not a restaurant specific

58:51

thing. This spans Nike to Lulu, Aloe,

58:55

VRE, clothing. It spans all the way

58:57

into, you know, your your lowpriced

59:00

grocery items, your lowpriced, you know,

59:02

buying stuff from from Walmart Sprouts.

59:05

So, that's the second thing.

59:06

Yeah. Austin, let's let's fold Nike into

59:09

the conversation here because I think

59:10

that that this is a there's there's a a

59:12

connection here for sure.

59:14

So Nike is experiencing this. Lulu's

59:16

experienced this. They are also both

59:18

experiencing the fallout of bad

59:19

management. So they Nike and Lulu unlike

59:23

Chipotle is experiencing a two uh you

59:27

know these same things I've talked about

59:28

that Chipotle is going through. They're

59:30

not experiencing the Ozmpic thing

59:32

obviously. Um, but then they're

59:34

experiencing a companyspecific bad

59:37

management event which is really

59:38

compounding the fall of of these

59:40

companies. I don't think Elliot Hill is

59:42

the guy that caused it. I think it was,

59:44

you know, the the guy before Elliot Hill

59:45

at Nike. Um, it's definitely Lulu's

59:49

current management minus Heidi O'Neal

59:52

who literally just started like uh like

59:54

three weeks ago. So, don't blame Heidi

59:56

um on that. But yeah, Phil, you really

59:59

we posted a short of you and Brandon

1:00:01

just talking about the the Lulu drum

1:00:04

incident, you know, and it's like these

1:00:07

companies cannot get out of their own

1:00:10

way, you know, that that short on

1:00:12

YouTube is so funny of of you and

1:00:14

Brandon going back and forth on Lulu.

1:00:16

You know, it's really unfortunate, but

1:00:18

Lulu

1:00:19

through all the bad management somehow

1:00:22

in the last quarter managed to screw up

1:00:27

the only segment in the entire world of

1:00:30

business that was still doing really

1:00:31

well by putting a Japanese drum on the

1:00:34

Great Wall of China during a a

1:00:37

nationwide streamed yoga event. You

1:00:40

know, it's just like so I I it's hard to

1:00:43

talk about those two. Nike, Lulu, and

1:00:46

group it in with Chipotle because

1:00:48

they've got the next level of of what

1:00:51

should be a value investor's best friend

1:00:53

is bad management as long as the right

1:00:56

management, you know, gets gets back in

1:00:58

there and fixes it. Okay. Um, so go back

1:01:02

to Chipotle really quick. And then the

1:01:03

the third thing is that there's a finite

1:01:07

amount of money. Let's let's remove our

1:01:09

like passive investing or active

1:01:11

investing. there's a finite amount of

1:01:13

money to put into equities and right

1:01:15

now, Phil, that YouTube video that you

1:01:18

posted two weeks ago on this, I think

1:01:20

really highlighted it that um where the

1:01:23

S&P 500 is right now, what was it? 79%

1:01:27

of the companies in the S&P 500, so

1:01:30

that's almost that's like 400 of the 500

1:01:33

companies, their year-to-ate stock

1:01:35

returns of those companies are lower,

1:01:39

less than the index. So 20% as we've

1:01:42

been talking about the index is driving

1:01:44

the return. You look at those 20 that

1:01:46

that 20% of companies that are driving

1:01:48

all the return it is only AI. If you are

1:01:51

not tied to AI in some way and you know

1:01:54

people will say oh well Caterpillar is

1:01:55

doing super well. No Caterpillar is

1:01:57

doing super well because they're buying

1:01:58

that equipment to build data centers.

1:02:00

They're directly tied to the AI

1:02:03

buildout. And so it's it's a tale of two

1:02:05

worlds in the indexes and money flows

1:02:08

out of anything that is even even having

1:02:11

the slightest hint of not doing stellar

1:02:16

into AI. So it's like I think that's the

1:02:18

also the big thing with Chipotle is it's

1:02:20

like hey if we didn't have this AI thing

1:02:23

going on I think Wall Street would look

1:02:25

at you know the other two things on

1:02:27

Chipotle that are happening it might be

1:02:28

down you know 10 15%. But here we start

1:02:33

to see a slowdown and they're like, I

1:02:35

could keep my money in Chipotle or I

1:02:37

could follow everybody else's money and

1:02:39

dump it into AI and that causes a much

1:02:42

bigger drop in the the the stocks that

1:02:46

just aren't, you know, having stellar

1:02:49

every single quarter amazing things. So,

1:02:51

the first two things I talked about are

1:02:53

leading to Chipotle not just continuing

1:02:55

to beat and have these incredible, you

1:02:58

know, same store sales growth numbers.

1:03:00

The the third piece is why the stock I

1:03:02

think is down 50% more than anything

1:03:04

else.

1:03:05

Yeah. I'm sitting here looking at what

1:03:07

Chip Wilson is doing over at Amir

1:03:10

Sports. And it just really ticks me off

1:03:13

as a as a Lulu shareholder that he has

1:03:17

been pounding this board for a decade

1:03:21

saying you're losing the edge. You're

1:03:22

losing the edge. You're going for mass

1:03:24

market. You're doing the wrong kind of

1:03:25

marketing. You're trying to be

1:03:27

politically correct. You're hiring the

1:03:28

wrong people. I mean, he's been pounding

1:03:30

that drum, pounding that drum. And

1:03:32

meanwhile, of course, over this decade,

1:03:34

Chipotle's just going bigger and bigger

1:03:36

and bigger and bigger as they expand

1:03:38

their market to every person on the

1:03:40

planet and try to make every person on

1:03:42

the planet the person Lulu. Who am I

1:03:45

saying? Chipotle. Yeah, Lulu. And so,

1:03:48

and so you end up with with uh you end

1:03:52

up with this company that in my opinion,

1:03:55

this is politically probably very

1:03:56

incorrect, so I apologize right up

1:03:58

front, but you don't have your

1:04:02

advertising. You don't you should have

1:04:04

aspirational advertising for a company

1:04:05

like Lulu. It should be aspirational. I

1:04:07

should want to be that. It's a Patagonia

1:04:09

kind of company. Show the person

1:04:11

climbing Denali. Okay. Okay. I'm not

1:04:14

gonna climb Denali, but boy, when I go

1:04:16

out in the rain in New York, I want that

1:04:18

Denali coat. It's just, you know, it's

1:04:22

that way that works. And here's Chipotle

1:04:25

putting I mean, I'm sorry, but they're

1:04:27

putting fat people out there on their

1:04:30

posters. They're putting them out in

1:04:31

their tights. They're showing old people

1:04:35

like younger than me, but old people

1:04:38

wearing Chipotle or Chipotle wearing

1:04:41

Lulu stuff. And it's like, why wouldn't

1:04:43

they just advertise me? I mean, hey, you

1:04:46

know, Phil Town is out there wearing

1:04:48

Chipotle wearing Lulu's stuff and you

1:04:52

should wear it. I'm probably wearing

1:04:53

Chipotle, too, if I'm my typical

1:04:56

Chipotle meal lands on my shirt. But

1:04:59

this is this is this is what I hope we

1:05:02

can put this up in the in the uh podcast

1:05:05

because this is Ammer Sports

1:05:07

advertising. Look what that thing says.

1:05:10

It's so smart. He's saying how

1:05:13

engineering creates athletic success.

1:05:16

Great. Wh Why isn't that a Lulu ad? Come

1:05:19

on. [laughter] Why the hell? You've got

1:05:23

You've got two beautiful people. Yeah,

1:05:26

you got two beautiful people there.

1:05:28

They're slender. They obviously are in

1:05:30

the gym. They're aspirational. Wake the

1:05:34

f up, Lulu. I mean, it's just so stupid

1:05:37

to put people up there just because

1:05:39

they're every man. It doesn't work. and

1:05:41

you you lost your market and but what's

1:05:44

really crazy is you lost it to Aloe.

1:05:47

Their product is not as good and it's

1:05:50

just like come on man wake up. So that's

1:05:53

that's my thing about Lulu is they've

1:05:55

also got a bit of a big marketing issue

1:05:57

that they just could fix and they're

1:05:59

going to I hope and bring that company

1:06:01

back with Chipotle. I think inflation

1:06:05

just smoked them. I think when you go to

1:06:07

a $21 burrito, you know, you've really

1:06:10

got a problem. And and here's the thing

1:06:13

I that I don't understand about Chipotle

1:06:16

at all. I go in there and I walk down

1:06:18

the line with my burrito and I come to

1:06:21

the checkout, go to try to eat it. That

1:06:24

burrito is bigger today. I swear it's

1:06:27

bigger today than it was 10 years ago.

1:06:29

It's like it used to fit o okay inside

1:06:33

the burrito inside inside the tortilla.

1:06:36

And now it doesn't it doesn't fit. So

1:06:40

I'm like, what are they telling their

1:06:42

line to do here?

1:06:44

I had a bowl just the other day. It took

1:06:47

me two meals to eat the bowl. It was

1:06:49

like I just got like a steak bowl and I

1:06:51

took the top off of it and it was so

1:06:54

jam-packed with food that like all the

1:06:57

guacamole and the salsa and the cheese

1:06:59

was caked completely compressed and

1:07:02

caked into the lid cuz they just mashed

1:07:05

it down onto there to like fit it in.

1:07:07

And it's like that makes me so happy

1:07:10

about Chipotle.

1:07:11

It's so stupid. I'm like, I'm buying a

1:07:15

$20 bowl, but it's really $10 a meal cuz

1:07:18

it takes me two meals to finish this

1:07:20

thing.

1:07:20

Then why in the world don't they put in

1:07:22

half the food and charge $10?

1:07:25

I don't know. Maybe they're just doing

1:07:26

the Costco hot dog thing, you know,

1:07:28

where they're like, "This is what we're

1:07:29

do. This is what we're known for. We're

1:07:31

not going to we're not going to go away

1:07:32

from from doing that." and you know they

1:07:34

got a 16-year-old kid back there trying

1:07:37

to you know fold your burrito up and all

1:07:40

you [laughter]

1:07:41

just absolute mess. It's it's part of

1:07:44

the charm of Chipotle, you know. So I I

1:07:47

agree. I you know say what you want. If

1:07:50

they change their serving size, I'm not

1:07:52

going to be super happy about it. So

1:07:55

yeah, I mean that was that was a thought

1:07:56

that I had with Chipotle as well. So

1:07:58

yeah, we're we'll wrap uh wrap

1:08:00

Salesforce in here as well. We've talked

1:08:02

a little bit about about Nike, Chipotle,

1:08:04

and Lululemon. Actually, uh Nike and

1:08:07

Lululemon being kind of in the same boat

1:08:08

here. Some major management missteps uh

1:08:11

that have led to to some unfavorable uh

1:08:16

unfavorable conditions for those

1:08:17

companies. So, Salesforce in a little

1:08:19

bit of a different boat, I think. Uh

1:08:21

it's been a a serial compounder. great

1:08:24

company that's compounded uh revenues at

1:08:28

uh double digits, compounded free cash

1:08:30

flow and earnings at over 20% for 15

1:08:33

years plus now and right in line with

1:08:37

this time period where we have uh AI and

1:08:39

Agentic AI coming online. The company's

1:08:42

kind of begun to mature a little bit uh

1:08:45

have saturated the market. has 92% of

1:08:48

S&P 500 companies that are using

1:08:49

Salesforce products um and getting to a

1:08:53

point now where they are just trying to

1:08:55

work on on improving earnings via uh

1:08:58

shrinking margins a little bit. Um but

1:09:01

at this point uh we have a really

1:09:03

dominant software company that there's

1:09:05

this fear out there that Agentic AI is

1:09:08

is there's kind of two main issues,

1:09:10

right? you're going to have AI uh

1:09:12

capabilities that they're going to help

1:09:14

to build a an application that replaces

1:09:18

what it what Salesforce does. And then

1:09:20

on the other hand, you have this idea

1:09:22

that the number of seats, you know,

1:09:25

remember that Salesforce is on a seat

1:09:26

model, meaning that if you have a 100

1:09:29

people in your organization that are

1:09:31

going to use Salesforce, they sell you

1:09:34

essentially 100 licenses. Um so the if

1:09:37

the number of people that have to use uh

1:09:40

the technology the software is is

1:09:43

decreasing then the the per seat model

1:09:46

is is not going to work. Um so two kind

1:09:49

of attacking fronts there but what we've

1:09:52

seen over the course of this AI buildout

1:09:54

is that Salesforce is continuing to be

1:09:57

dominant in their in their field.

1:09:58

They're growing uh significantly.

1:10:00

They've had several significant earnings

1:10:03

beats. uh their backlog of work

1:10:05

continues to grow. Um and this is kind

1:10:08

of an instance of a little bit of a of a

1:10:11

casualty of the prevailing trade out

1:10:14

there, which is these AI companies. And

1:10:17

looking at um Salesforce's stock

1:10:20

performance compared to really any of

1:10:23

the big AI adjacent companies and they

1:10:26

are almost mirror images of each other.

1:10:28

Meaning that in these time periods when

1:10:30

these AI companies are doing really

1:10:32

well, Salesforce is always doing poorly,

1:10:35

their stock price that is is is moving

1:10:37

in the downward direction. And then when

1:10:39

those trends reverse, we see a reversal

1:10:41

there, meaning that people are pouring

1:10:43

out of this enterprise software and into

1:10:46

AI. And when that narrative changes a

1:10:48

little bit, there's a little bit of a

1:10:49

fear of a bubble. Then money comes

1:10:51

pouring back into software and out of

1:10:53

AI. So, uh, a little bit of a different

1:10:55

situation here when we're looking at a

1:10:57

company that has just fallen out of

1:10:59

favor with the market, but we think is

1:11:01

still a really dominant business.

1:11:03

Yeah, I think th this is, uh, this is

1:11:05

really interesting because when you when

1:11:08

you think about what AI is actually

1:11:10

enabling people to do, okay, you know,

1:11:13

we're we've spent a lot of time trying

1:11:15

to keep up with AI and AI capabilities

1:11:17

and we have a lot of contacts in

1:11:19

enterprise businesses throughout the

1:11:21

country, right? So we're we're talking

1:11:23

to people and at the end of the day, you

1:11:25

know, AI is very powerful, but the

1:11:29

thought that it could replace an

1:11:32

enterprise system like Salesforce,

1:11:35

it's it you have to really think about

1:11:38

what that means because AI, yes, I'm

1:11:41

seeing people with AI assisted coding

1:11:45

building really cool applications like

1:11:48

very, you know, interesting interfaces,

1:11:51

you know, uh nicel looking software.

1:11:55

But I think what people forget is that

1:11:58

coding was never the moat, right? So the

1:12:02

moat of Salesforce was not that you

1:12:04

could write code and and the faster you

1:12:06

wrote code, the better the product was

1:12:09

going to be. That was never the case,

1:12:11

right? I think I think the moat of

1:12:13

companies like Salesforce

1:12:16

are the fact that they understand the

1:12:18

business processes of their customers

1:12:20

and they're embedded deeply into their

1:12:22

system. So Salesforce is going to be

1:12:24

connected to, you know, multiple um

1:12:27

integrations in terms of data,

1:12:29

databases,

1:12:30

other systems are all feeding

1:12:32

information in there.

1:12:34

Um, and as a large company,

1:12:37

well, any company really, but a large

1:12:39

enterprise in particular, you're really

1:12:42

dependent on trust. You're trusting that

1:12:45

solution to give you a secure

1:12:47

environment where you can do business,

1:12:49

right? And so, you know, I think the

1:12:52

joke we made is that, you know, you're

1:12:55

it's you could just imagine your

1:12:57

resignation letter if you're a CFO at a

1:13:01

at a company that said, "Yeah, I decided

1:13:04

to go with a vibecoded um solution and I

1:13:07

tore out Salesforce, I I resign." Right?

1:13:10

I mean, that that's like the perfect

1:13:12

resignation letter. And I don't think

1:13:14

anybody ever gets fired for going with

1:13:16

Salesforce, right? And and there's

1:13:19

that's a huge piece for me is these that

1:13:21

moat is very deep. And what I love about

1:13:25

Salesforce in particular is they've

1:13:27

actually leaned in they've leaned into

1:13:29

AI. So they're not running from AI to to

1:13:34

your point that you were making earlier,

1:13:35

Hunter, these guys are leaning into um

1:13:38

switching. They know that their seat

1:13:40

model is at risk and so they're leaning

1:13:42

in using these agenic work units, I

1:13:45

think is what they're called. Is that is

1:13:46

that right? um AWUs agenic work units.

1:13:50

So So basically they're saying rather

1:13:52

than charging you per seat, I'm going to

1:13:55

I'm going to put in an agent force agent

1:13:59

that can do the job of a human and I'm

1:14:02

going to charge you by task that it

1:14:05

completes. And I think in their last

1:14:07

earnings call they reported um like a

1:14:11

57% increase in those units um quarter

1:14:15

over quarter. And that's a huge jump.

1:14:17

And I think it starts to show that these

1:14:21

guys have the ability to actually

1:14:23

replace their model um from a seatbased

1:14:26

model to a um you know a taskbased

1:14:30

model, right? So so the analogy there

1:14:33

would be since it's football season,

1:14:35

right? Um if if you have a football team

1:14:37

that uses Salesforce and Salesforce, you

1:14:41

know, used to get paid per roster spot.

1:14:44

Now, what they're saying is that every

1:14:46

player on the team is basically

1:14:50

charging a fee for every snap that they

1:14:52

play. So, every time they take a snap,

1:14:54

they're going to they're going to get

1:14:55

paid versus, you know, they're going to

1:14:57

pay Salesforce just because they've got

1:14:59

somebody on the roster. And so, now

1:15:02

Salesforce is going to be basically

1:15:04

incented to get in and help these

1:15:08

companies complete as many tasks as

1:15:10

possible.

1:15:12

and they're going to do it with their

1:15:14

solution integrated into their platform

1:15:16

and I think it actually makes their

1:15:17

switching mode potentially even even

1:15:19

stronger than it was before in my view.

1:15:22

So I know Hunter you've done a ton of

1:15:24

work on this um as well. I don't know

1:15:26

what what your thoughts are there but to

1:15:27

me that I think is a real key for the

1:15:29

for these guys long term.

1:15:31

Yeah I mean I think another thought here

1:15:34

um and Phil I'd love to hear your

1:15:35

opinion on this having run multiple

1:15:38

businesses. Another thought here is that

1:15:40

as uh as kind of AI solutions and AI

1:15:44

models become more and more affordable,

1:15:46

we see the gap between these frontier

1:15:48

models and and other uh open-source

1:15:52

models, their capabilities is shrinking

1:15:54

day by day. That gap is that it's

1:15:57

becoming less of a question of of either

1:16:01

or. Do you deploy a bunch of capital

1:16:04

towards an AI vibecoded solution or do

1:16:08

you deploy a bunch of capital towards

1:16:10

maintaining your Salesforce framework?

1:16:13

Now, it's becoming more of a question

1:16:15

of, hey, well, can I just have a a

1:16:17

cheaper but very highly effective

1:16:20

effective open-source AI model working

1:16:23

on top of my Salesforce ecosystem that

1:16:25

for a lot of these companies has been

1:16:27

curated over the course of 20 years that

1:16:30

is highly complex with a bunch of

1:16:31

different systems that are connected to

1:16:33

each other and kind of take most of the

1:16:35

risk off the table. So, I think that

1:16:37

that's another interesting uh

1:16:39

interesting component of this. Do you

1:16:40

have any thoughts there, Phil? Yeah, I

1:16:41

mean it it's really all about your cost

1:16:43

really because if if if you know you can

1:16:47

build out this this layer on top of

1:16:50

Salesforce's

1:16:52

really solid foundation

1:16:54

um and and get away with it, then you're

1:16:56

really going to make that I mean I think

1:16:58

Travis could probably answer this better

1:16:59

than me, but I for me you would make

1:17:01

that judgment based on how excited you

1:17:04

are about managing your own your own

1:17:06

processes. And I'm not sure that the

1:17:09

cost of Salesforce is worth the the

1:17:12

problems that you run into when you have

1:17:14

to layer up another layer of management,

1:17:16

got another team out there that's got to

1:17:18

do all this stuff. Why would you? I

1:17:20

mean, unless you're just unless you're

1:17:22

say, you know, you're going to increase

1:17:24

your earnings by 20% or something as a

1:17:26

result, but I don't think you are. Not

1:17:28

only that, but over the last three years

1:17:32

as as AI comes roaring in here and

1:17:35

Salesforce gets hammered in the stock

1:17:37

market,

1:17:39

their free cash flow and operating cash

1:17:41

have gone up like rocket ships. I mean,

1:17:45

the last three years, their growth rate

1:17:47

on net income, operating cash, free cash

1:17:49

flow are all way up in double digits, up

1:17:53

above 20%. The only thing that's

1:17:56

anywhere near a slowdown in their growth

1:17:59

rate is on their revenue. And you know

1:18:02

there there's a a an immediate slowdown

1:18:04

in revenue as all of these Fortune 500

1:18:07

companies take a deep breath and try to

1:18:09

see if they're going to go to AI. And I

1:18:12

mean one after another they're going

1:18:13

like ah no I don't think so. And I just

1:18:17

had the personal experience just a

1:18:18

little sense of this when I started to

1:18:21

try to use Agentic AI to be my executive

1:18:25

assistant. And it it took me about two

1:18:29

weeks before I was like, "Okay, I'm

1:18:30

hiring an executive assistant who's a

1:18:32

human. Just too much hassle. I was

1:18:36

spending so much time messing with it."

1:18:38

So I'd rather not mess with it. That's

1:18:40

the whole idea of an executive

1:18:41

assistant. So I think you know the whole

1:18:43

agentic thing may be a lot farther out

1:18:47

than anybody thinks if it ever gets

1:18:49

here. Um so I I think what we've got is

1:18:53

a really great case that uh Salesforce

1:18:56

is is a a very viable company at the

1:18:59

right price. I really do think so.

1:19:01

Yeah. I think I think your instincts are

1:19:02

right, Phil. I think you know that you

1:19:04

think about the effort to build your own

1:19:08

solution. I mean, not only is it, you

1:19:10

know, managing your own processes and

1:19:12

potentially building up your own team,

1:19:13

but think about the risk you're taking.

1:19:15

I mean, you're what's the point of

1:19:18

ripping out Salesforce or some kind of

1:19:21

ERP system for to save I mean, how much

1:19:25

money are you actually going to save for

1:19:26

that risk? I mean, I I can tell you

1:19:29

right now, CFOs,

1:19:32

uh, chief operating officers, these guys

1:19:33

are riskadverse creatures, right? You're

1:19:35

you're not gonna unless the the the

1:19:38

benefit is massive,

1:19:40

you don't want to step into the ring

1:19:43

with Mike Tyson unless you have to,

1:19:45

right? And ripping out a sales force is

1:19:49

like you're going to take a punch for

1:19:50

Mike Tyson. If you make a mistake,

1:19:53

you're going to get crushed. You're

1:19:54

going to get crushed, right? And I think

1:19:57

that's what people are forgetting. It it

1:19:59

seems like to me that these guys um you

1:20:02

know just the scuttlebutt out there on

1:20:04

the street is that nobody's laying off

1:20:07

anybody because of AI.

1:20:10

I just you just don't hear it. Where

1:20:12

where's all these cost savings going to

1:20:14

coming from and I just don't see it. I

1:20:17

don't I mean people are getting more

1:20:19

efficient. You know we're more efficient

1:20:21

in our shop. We're definitely more

1:20:23

efficient. We're not laying off anybody.

1:20:25

It's it's Javon's Javon's paradox,

1:20:27

right?

1:20:29

just expect more out of everyone.

1:20:31

Yeah, everybody's better. You better put

1:20:33

it up your game, right? You got to do

1:20:35

that. So,

1:20:36

I think you're I think you're spot on.

1:20:37

I've been talking to people that I know

1:20:39

in different companies, um you know,

1:20:41

Intel, Microsoft, uh contacts I have,

1:20:44

they're all saying the same thing.

1:20:46

They're all saying, "Hey, you know,

1:20:47

we're using um AI and we're getting more

1:20:50

efficient, but all that's doing for them

1:20:52

right now is allow allowing them to

1:20:54

focus on higher leverage items, more

1:20:57

important things that they in less busy

1:20:59

work, right? But where is that use case

1:21:03

that ultimately says,

1:21:06

hey, I'm I'm now saving so much time

1:21:09

that I can eliminate whole processes and

1:21:11

therefore a whole bunch of people." I

1:21:14

haven't heard that yet. It's not that it

1:21:15

may not come, but I think it's a lot

1:21:18

further away than we think it is in my

1:21:20

view.

1:21:21

All right, guys. Well, I think that was

1:21:22

a good discussion. Thank you everyone

1:21:24

for listening to the Rule One podcast um

1:21:26

for Phil, Travis, Austin, and myself. Um

1:21:31

we will chat with you guys later.

1:21:33

Thanks.