In this episode we cover
- Twenty midterms and what the market did next
- The market is just the weather
- The checklist question on political risk
- Phil's father and the 15% bond
- Netflix and the newspaper playbook
- Paramount's debt problem
- Wine vs. milk: Disney and Netflix content
- Buybacks over acquisitions
Show notes
"This is not a strategy that requires you to be smart. It just requires you to be patient and disciplined." That's how Phil Town sums up Rule One investing early in this episode, and it ties together everything the team covers, from elections to Netflix.
The first question is one a lot of investors asked this month: should the midterm results change what you do with your money? Hunter Hoffler went back through every midterm since 1946, and the market was higher a year later all 20 times. Austin Bowen's counterpoint is the fun part. He ran the same test on 20 random days and got almost the same answer.
So does politics ever matter? Travis Parker says yes, which is why political risk has its own question on the Rule One checklist. Austin learned that the hard way, watching Russian ADRs collapse almost overnight after the invasion of Ukraine, and it changed how he thinks about owning Chinese companies.
Phil's story about his father is worth the listen on its own. In the 1980s, his dad locked in bonds at about 15%, but only for five years, because he was convinced rates would keep climbing. It's a reminder that fear can feel a lot like analysis when you're in the middle of it.
The second half is a listener question about Netflix losing Warner Bros. to Paramount Skydance. Austin's answer runs through the newspaper industry, where most of the papers that borrowed to get bigger didn't survive. Phil isn't fully convinced Netflix can keep making hits, and that back-and-forth doesn't fully resolve.
The second half is a listener question about Netflix losing Warner Bros. to Paramount Skydance. Austin's answer runs through the newspaper industry, where most of the papers that borrowed to get bigger didn't survive. Phil isn't fully convinced Netflix can keep making hits, and that back-and-forth doesn't fully resolve.
Rule One Investing provides investment education and training only. We do not provide personalized investment advice, manage client assets, or guarantee investment returns. All content is for informational purposes. Consult a qualified financial professional before investing. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Individual results vary.
Resources from this episode
Transcript
Full text of the episode, on this page.
Cold open
Phil Town: [Clip from later in the episode] When you do what we do, you're not going to stay with the market all the time. And Charlie and Warren have said many times, if you can't handle a 50% drop in a stock that you own, you have no business doing this kind of investing.
Welcome and introductions
Hunter Hoffler: All right, welcome, everybody, to the Rule One Podcast. Today we're joined by Phil Town, bestselling author and manager of the Rule One Fund; Travis Parker; Austin Bowen; and myself, who are all portfolio managers working for Rule One Partners. This week we're going to be talking about several things that are kind of poignant. First, elections, and whether we as value investors should really be concerned about the outcome, or whether we should even trade through them to begin with. A lot of times we have this thought of, maybe we're going to hold on to our capital, maybe choose to deploy it before or after an election, but not through it. So we're going to talk a little bit about that.
Hunter: We're going to talk about a fan-submitted question about the Netflix–Warner Bros. merger that ended up falling through, and what the fallout could be from that, both positive and negative. And then we're going to talk about a company that we've looked into a couple times. It's really interesting, kind of a picks-and-shovels play in the AI space, called Vertiv, that makes air conditioning and equipment like that, as well as power distribution equipment. So thank you, guys, for joining us on the number one investing podcast in the world.
Should investors care about elections?
Hunter: And with that, we will go ahead and get started talking a little bit about elections. We just had, a couple weeks ago, the midterm election, where the power shifted from a Republican Congress to a Democratic Congress, and what that might mean for us. What we ended up doing is going back and looking at what's happened in the past through these midterms. We have this idea a lot of times, especially with our options trading, that we want to hold on to our capital and not deploy it in the options market through an election, because there's often short-term, sometimes longer-lived, volatility based on the outcome of a midterm or even a presidential election.
Hunter: And the first data point that I'd like to discuss with you guys, which was super interesting to me, is that we went back and looked post–World War II, from 1946 all the way through this current midterm. So that's 80 years of data; that's 20 different midterm elections. And in all 20 of those, if you went a year out from that midterm election, the market was up, 20 out of 20 times. Which is kind of telling us two stories, in my opinion, and if you guys have another view of this, let's chat about it. One is that over time, the market has gone up and to the right. That's no surprise to anybody. The other thing about this is that it doesn't seem like—
Phil: Hunter, did you just say that one of the things we learned from this is that the market goes up? That we have learned in the past that over 80 years the market has absolutely gone up—
Austin Bowen: I think he was saying that in a joking fashion, like it was a little tongue-in-cheek [laughter], Phil. Yep. He wasn't trying to extrapolate that as a fact-finding, objective point. [laughter]
Phil: That's a really good point. I think we can all agree on that.
Hunter: We just did all this research, and we did find out that the market does go up over time. [laughter] In fact, the market has gone up in the last 80 years. Breaking news on the Rule One Podcast.
Hunter: Anyway, another thing that data ends up indicating is that even over that one-year period, there might be some volatility introduced at some point during the year, but a lot of times the general trend of the market just continues through an election. So with that, let's open it up to a little bit of a discussion and talk about how we feel about investing through an election, and whether it's something we should even think about, a presidential or a midterm election, here in the U.S.
Phil: Well, I would like to say that if we have something that's happened 20 times in a row, 20 times in a row, and you'd like to make a really big pile of money, what I'll do is place a bet that it'll happen the 21st time, and you should bet against me [laughter], because the emotional rule of investing is that if I go in on that for the 21st time, it'll be the first time in 20 times that this doesn't happen. So I'm tempted. I'm really tempted to go with that.
Austin: Just to put a counter in here, Phil: I did ask AI to just pick 20 days in the past 80 years at random and tell me what the one-year returns after those 20 random days were. And 19 of 20 times, they were profitable at the one-year mark. [laughter] I did that just to say that it's not too telling. I think a lot of it just goes back to the market, more often than not, going up in the long run. So your chances of picking 20 dates in the future… I get it that this one does have an election.
Austin: And I think the narrative that Hunter's trying to point out is that people feel that they should do a certain thing based on the outcome of an election. And the data just unequivocally says that you should not, under any circumstances, unless it's bullish, base your investing decisions off of the outcome of a midterm election. You need to look at other factors out in the world, not the results of an election.
Hunter: So, on the 21st time here, it is going to be another factor. That's another way to say it. The 21st time, when the market does fall in the year after a midterm, it's going to be another factor that does it.
Hunter: And the reason for looking into this, I thought, was kind of interesting: leading up to this midterm, just chatting with people, I don't know how many times we've had conversations with people that say, "Oh, when Trump was elected, I pulled all my money out of the market," or "When the Democrats took Congress, I put all my money in," or took all their money out. And we're sitting here thinking, I don't know if that's really the way to look at things. We take a step back and say we want to buy companies that we can hold on to forever, regardless of what the political landscape is.
Hunter: And that's one of the things that we look at when we're determining the moat of a business: is there any sort of political action that could be taken that could have a really outsized effect on this business? And that answer's got to be no for us. So this is just another data point that I thought was really interesting, backing up the idea that we should just ignore this stuff, I think. What do you think, Travis? [laughter]
Travis Parker: Yeah. No, it's a super interesting discussion. Short of our options trades, and being cautious during a potentially volatile event, that's what I've always loved about this style of investing: whether it's a political election or otherwise, you can kind of ignore a lot of the macro noise if you have a business you're capable of understanding and it has a strong competitive advantage that's not going to be disrupted by some political event, right? Because there are political policies that could disrupt some businesses, but if you've done your homework on those businesses…
Travis: Great: if the election brings you an opportunity to buy into a great business, we don't have to care about that, right? We just have to understand the business. We have to understand if the event that's creating this opportunity is something they can navigate in the next one to three years. And we can kind of be immune to all this stuff. That's what I love about our style. It's based on value, plain and simple.
The market is just the weather
Phil: I keep thinking about Warren Buffett's example of owning a farm. You're owning this farm for the long term into the future, and you've got a farmer next door whose property borders yours, and every day he stands out there shouting across the fence the price that he would pay for your farm. If you're going to buy this farm and hold it for a long period of time, you have no interest in whatever this guy is shouting. It doesn't matter at all, unless he's shouting a number that's so low that you might be able to buy his farm for that. And that's really all you're concerned about.
Phil: So when we're looking at what the market's doing and where it's going as a market, it's definitely important, as you said, Trav. When we're looking at short-term options trades, we're definitely paying attention, and we're looking at charting and doing all of that. But in the long run, what we'd love to end up with is a great opportunity to buy a great company at a really cheap price, and it doesn't have to have anything to do with the market at all. It could just be some problem that company's having. It could be a problem in the industry. The market could be on a rocket-ship ride. It just has nothing to do with the market.
Phil: And what distinguishes this kind of investing from what happens on Wall Street is the incentives on Wall Street, which means really the majority of money in the market. It's incentivized by the need for fund managers on Wall Street to approximate what the market's doing, because if they don't do that… So they're paying very close attention to the market.
Phil: And you have cautionary tales like Bruce Berkowitz, who had an 18% compounded return going for over a decade, and in 2009, with $18 billion, he bought Citi, Bank of America and AIG. They went up a little bit in 2011, and then in the fall, when the Greek bonds froze up bond trading pretty much in Europe, oh man, the sell-off in banks was massive, and those stocks dropped about 30% below where he bought them. He dropped 30% below the market, and the market was up about 1 or 2% that year, in 2011. He was down like 30%, with $18 billion.
Phil: And here's where the cautionary tale comes in, man. All of the pension fund managers that had money with him yanked their money out, and he had to redeem $11 billion over the next quarter. And then, this was the classic: a year later, those stocks were up like 75%. Don't quote me on these numbers, but I'm ballparking it here: 75%, and the next year they were up another gigantic amount. And Kiplinger magazine, which talks to the retail investor about mutual funds, ran a front-page headline saying, "Don't invest with Bruce Berkowitz's Fairholme, because it is a volatile, dangerous fund," indicating it didn't matter to them that his compounded returns were better than 999 other funds out there. It didn't matter. What mattered was he wasn't staying with the market, and therefore he was dangerous.
Phil: And so on Wall Street, they've learned that lesson: just stay with the market. When you do what we do, you're not going to stay with the market all the time. And Charlie and Warren have said many times, if you can't handle a 50% drop in a stock that you own, you have no business doing this kind of investing, because that's going to happen to you. It's not that the value necessarily changes. Presumably, it doesn't. But some event going on out in the market, could be a market-wide recession, whatever, can easily take any company down 50%.
Phil: I remember really clearly investing in Chipotle Mexican Grill before the 2008 crash, or just sort of watching it crash during that. They had a return on invested capital of about 20% a year. They were growing at 20% a year. The recession in 2009 didn't slow their growth down at all; if anything, it accelerated it a bit. And yet their stock was down something like 60 or 70%. You'd have to check me on the numbers, but it was way down and became a massive buying opportunity.
Phil: So it's really important that you understand it. Investing the way we do it, and we try to approximate the way Warren and Charlie have done it, requires that you certainly will watch the market, but the market going up or down doesn't really have much to do at all with your final decisions. Those are related to individual companies and their value-to-price ratio changing in our favor, to produce that margin of safety. The market itself is just kind of the weather that we're in, right? It's the weather. It could be great weather, it could be bad weather. In bad weather, we still might not find anything we really want to buy, and in great weather, we almost certainly won't find anything we want to buy.
Phil: So we really have to wait for our opportunities at the individual company level, and not pursue a market-wide strategy, other than to just keep track, like we are right now, that we're in a crazy time for the market. We've got a Shiller P/E at 42. It's been here once before, right before the market crashed. And it is really ludicrous where the Wilshire-to-GDP is. People are arguing that now everything's changed, and we've heard that argument. If you've been around as long as I have, you've heard that argument repeatedly: "Oh yeah, now it's all changed." And eventually the gravity of economic reality catches up, and things go back to where they've been historically for 140 years. So we'll see what happens here and how long it might take to happen. But other than that, we're just interested in what we can find out there that's really good and really cheap.
Political risk: when it does matter
Travis: And I don't want to oversimplify it. I kind of felt like my opening statement there was maybe a little oversimplified. It's not that we ignore the political environment at all. In fact, on our checklist, we have a question that very specifically asks, is this company exposed to political risk? To the extent that you understand the business, the election shouldn't matter, right? Because you understand what political risk might mean if there's a shift in policy by whatever administration's in place. Presumably, you're going to understand the impact of that, and that may change your point of view on the business overall.
Travis: So I just wanted to bring that up, right? I don't want to oversimplify it and say that we ignore it completely. Elections, yeah, probably not as much, but we do think about political risk, especially if it's outside the business's control, management's control, to influence it. So I would just add that in as something that's really important when you're doing an analysis on a business.
Austin: Yeah, I would say that my biggest losing investment, dollar for dollar, personally, that I've ever had, and maybe not Phil, but Travis, I think you'd concur, came from ignoring the political risk of investing in Alibaba. When I was investing in it, I was doing all this research into China and President Xi and his whole history. He was cracking down on these companies with what he called "capitalism with Chinese characteristics," trying to bring everybody along. And I thought, long term, that it wouldn't have this crushing effect the market was portraying, that Xi was just going to destroy all capitalism in China, kind of like Mao had done back in the '50s or '60s.
Austin: What I failed to understand until the Ukraine–Russia war kicked off was that when Russia invaded Ukraine, our government, I think it was the Biden administration, and I don't want to unjustifiably blame Biden for this, but it was definitely our government, made it illegal to own Russian assets and Russian companies, as part of their protest. And Russian ADRs that you could have bought on U.S. stock exchanges dropped 95% in one day, just straight to almost nothing.
Austin: And in that moment, the ADRs for China were selling off, but I just had this huge awakening: I'm down 30, 40% right now, dollar for dollar, but man, if China invaded Taiwan and we did the same thing… Being down 30% is one thing. Being down 95% is absolutely devastating, especially when you're concentrated in an investment. So I think you do have to take in, kind of like Travis is saying, political risks. The risk of our U.S. government getting involved in stopping Chipotle from selling wholesome organic burritos is just not worth the squeeze. But if you want to take a stance on a Chinese ADR when we're in an adversarial stance, there's a huge risk that could just crop up one day, almost out of nowhere.
Austin: We got about a month, a month and a half, of warning on Russia actually invading Ukraine. These aren't things that are going to be telegraphed for years when they actually come to boots on the ground. They happen relatively quickly. So, yeah, crazy. But stick to simple companies, I think, is the right answer.
Phil: Yeah, I think so.
Phil: Yeah, it makes it a lot easier. When you're as simple as we are, it's very important. [laughter]
Hunter: Exactly.
Austin: Simpleminded. Is that what you're trying to say?
Phil: Simpleminded. [laughter] Yeah, thank God. This is not a strategy that requires you to be smart. It just requires you to be patient and disciplined. Those aren't that easy, either, but that's really the nitty-gritty of it. You find a few companies you can understand easily, you wait till they go on sale, and then you buy them, and then you shut up and sit there and watch them go.
Interest rates, policy and the Buffett view
Hunter: From the political point of view, the two things in this back test that had the biggest effect, as you might guess, were tariffs being imposed and any sort of Fed decision, to the extent that that's a political decision. But even rate hikes get telegraphed so far in advance, either in the bond market or through the political actions that are being taken. Anybody during 2020 to 2021 could have probably foreseen that there would be some fairly serious inflation, just based on the trillions of dollars that were injected into the market. It seemed to show up about 12 months later, when everybody thought it was going to. So I think it's probably more important to keep track of policy for those reasons.
Hunter: But even to that extent, we like to invest in companies that have really healthy cash flow, that aren't going to be affected by those things, and especially that are very unlikely to have to raise debt in a high-interest-rate environment. Right now we're seeing a lot of these neoclouds and the other companies we were talking about raising debt at like 16%. They're getting downgraded by the market, and it's going to be really hard for them to continue raising debt and be a cash-flow-positive business at the same time. So that's the sort of policy stuff that I think we need to look out for, rather than just the political winds.
Phil: I'm going to push back, just because Buffett took on that one thing at one point, and I don't know that he was completely serious. I'm just curious what you guys think. He said once that if the Federal Reserve chairman would tell him where interest rates were going to be a year later, he and Charlie wouldn't change a single thing that they're doing. In other words, it's irrelevant to the kind of investing Buffett was doing. You think he was serious about that?
Hunter: I think he was. And I hope maybe I just didn't get my point across. That's kind of the point that I'm trying to make: for the type of investments that we make, interest rates aren't going to have a major effect on the cash flow of those businesses, whereas for a heavily debt-laden business, there are going to be effects of rising interest rates when they have to issue more debt at a higher rate. That's kind of the point that I was trying to make.
Hunter: But I don't know if you would do nothing different.
Austin: I think it's all in proper context, which is an important thing. I know Buffett has talked about how, if interest rates are 10%, then you don't use a 10% discount rate on equities. He has talked about how he will happily take on government Treasuries that are offering 8% yields in lieu of an equity investment. But I think that's where the line gets drawn: he's not going to change any of his metrics of, is the company wonderful? Is he getting it at a big discount? The only thing he might ask himself is how big of a discount he wants with huge interest rate swings. If we've got 18% interest rates, or where we were back in the '80s, 15% interest rates and super-high inflation, he might not be saying, "Let's just go all in on 10-cap deals." He might be looking for a bigger deal than that.
Austin: But I think in his context, he was basically saying that when the market sells off 10 or 20% because of a quarter-point or half-point change in interest rates, that's ridiculous, and he would make absolutely no change to his investing style. If he knew, one year out, that rates were going to be up 1% or up half a percent, it would impact him zero.
Travis: Yeah, I agree. If you're looking long enough term, you've got a true long-term outlook and you've got a great business, and, as Hunter pointed out really, really cleanly, they have a clean balance sheet and they're not dependent on debt, I don't think you really change that much. You might see the market move, but in relationship to a business you're going to hold for 10-plus years, I don't think it changes anything Buffett does.
Austin: Now, I'd say that high interest rates wouldn't impact him. In 1986, I'm pretty sure interest rates were pretty high, and he bought a farm in Omaha at a 10 cap. [laughter]
Phil: I was going to guess that, with interest rates rolling at 15%, he's buying a 10 cap, and a building at a 10 cap in the '90s, in '93.
Austin: Yeah. With Larry Silverstein. Yeah.
Phil: So, bottom line, a 10 cap's a pretty good deal. Of course, if you'd put your money into a 30-year bond at 15% in 1983, '84, '85, you would have made so much money by now. You would have made so much money as interest rates came down; 15, 20 years later, they're at 3%, and you're sitting on a 15% yield. Oh my God, that bond would have been worth so much money. So yeah, we can theoretically say that it wouldn't really affect us, but we're human.
Hunter: Was the sentiment at the time, Phil, really that rates were going to remain that high for a long period?
Phil: I can tell you, man, my father was right in the middle of this, as a very unsophisticated investor. I had been investing for just a few years at that point, and he had just retired and had a choice to turn a benefit plan from this big company into cash. He decided to turn it into cash and buy bonds at that 15% rate, right? And I was talking to him and told him… I wasn't coming at this from my own self; I had just been around investors at that point in time who were converting stock investments into bonds at, I think, the 15 to 18% range, and they were going as long as they could get. And I was trying to encourage my dad to do it for his whole retirement, the 30-year bond, because then he'd have it locked in.
Phil: And he was so convinced that it was just going to keep getting worse. This is the emotion that happens in the marketplace: people were afraid the United States was going down the tubes and that our money was going to be going down the tubes. And a good friend of mine who was running a fund out of Malibu looked at the data and told me, and I don't know if this is true, that up to this point, no nation had ever incurred this high of an interest rate without losing its monetary value permanently. Of course, the U.S. was a nation with the reserve currency of the world, so we had something going for us that other countries didn't have.
Phil: When interest rates are at 15% or 17% or whatever they were on long bonds, there's a reason. People aren't all just buying it, right? They're saying, "I don't know, maybe it's going to be 20 next year." So my dad did five years with these bonds. He had five good years at a really high rate, and when he came back to the market with all that cash, bonds were at like nine or eight, and that was so much different. He took a 50% haircut in cash flow. [laughter] Of course, he had me and my brothers to cover it, so it all worked out for him just really good. But yeah, that's the problem, Hunter. At that point in time, it's hard to go long 30 years, because you're in a highly inflationary environment and gold has gone through the roof, and you don't know what's going to happen.
Austin: Yeah. I think back to 2020, 2021, which wasn't nearly as bad as that, but we were extremely worried about hyperinflation getting away. And the biggest concern we had, which does go to politics, was: where are they going to draw the line on stopping the spending? In 2022 we hit 9%. But Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema from Arizona are probably the only two people in U.S. politics who can directly say that their actions stopped inflation from getting a hell of a lot worse, because they shut down another $2 trillion spending package, and basically sabotaged their political careers doing it.
Phil: Yeah. And since then, everybody got that cautionary tale really clearly. And now nobody's stepping into the breach. [laughter]
Hunter: Yeah. Just comparing that environment, Phil, to today's environment, where Google just issued their century bond at 6%, wasn't it? A corporate bond at 6% for 100 years. We're talking about high inflation right now. High rates at the moment. I mean, come on.
Phil: I don't really get it, honestly. Who puts money up for 100 years at 6%? What is that all about, when you've got a government that's rapidly going toward bankruptcy? The only way out of the bankruptcy, which they won't allow to happen when you have a printing press, is to print, and that's it. How does that not turn into bigger and bigger inflation rates? I don't get it.
Hunter: It has got to just be bond traders that are hopping in. A 100-year bond at 6%: if rates fall to 4%, they're going to make a killing.
Listener question: Netflix, Warner Bros. and Paramount
Hunter: OK. Well, you guys ready? Let's move on to talk about the Netflix and Warner Bros. merger that was not to be. Netflix got their bid up to maybe $27 a share for Warner Bros., I think, before Paramount came in offering $31 a share and ended up winning that bid. And the market reacted with a little bit of a whipsaw. A lot of people love Netflix for the fact that it's a cash flow machine with very little debt, and they were trying to raise a bridge loan of, I think, $59 billion to fund this acquisition of Warner Bros. So when the potential merger was announced, Netflix stock fell fairly significantly, and then it recovered fairly significantly when Paramount ended up winning that bid.
Hunter: So, Austin, I was going to pass it over to you to talk a little bit about what the fallout might be from that merger not going through. And by the way, to everybody listening, this was actually a listener-submitted question. If you go to ruleoneinvesting.com, go to the podcast page and click on any of our episodes, you can submit questions that we will read, and they might actually get on one of our future episodes for us to discuss. So I wanted to throw that in there. But Austin, if you want to discuss what some of the fallout might be from this deal not going through.
Austin: So, I think the exact question was: now that Paramount Skydance basically won, how does that directly impact Netflix? Before I get into it, obviously there's going to be increased competition for Netflix one-on-one with a company. But I want to take a little bit of a step back and go at this, before I dive into the company specifics, with a big industry overview and a historical comparison.
What newspapers can teach about streaming
Austin: What is happening to, let's call it, the Hollywood studio industry is very, very similar to what has happened to newspapers all over America. Or you could look at hotels with Airbnb, or even taxis with Uber. You have this historical business that was fairly decentralized and controlled by those who had the means of distribution. If you look at a newspaper: if you had the means of sending out newspapers in your area, then you controlled probably one of the best ways, outside of radio, for businesses to advertise. You paid writers and you controlled information.
Austin: And companies like Craigslist, Google and Facebook had this way of distributing information globally, not just regionally, that was free. All the content that's produced on Facebook is free, and the better somebody is at producing content, the more people engage with it. That really disrupted the newspaper business in America. If you go back to the year 2000 and fast-forward to today, newspaper revenues in the U.S. are down like 80% overall from where they were.
Austin: What has emerged is that almost everybody went bankrupt and failed, with the exception of a couple of really big platforms like The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times or the Financial Times, where they essentially had a base and a need or desire that outweighed just the general everyday news. So your local Daily Inter Lake up in Kalispell, Montana, where I went: they don't have the power, the know-how, the people to get the stories that separate them from what you can just get on TikTok or X or Facebook or YouTube.
Austin: And if you look at newspapers, what ended up happening along the way to where we are today is that as newspapers started struggling, there was this huge consolidation effort to try to gain scale. They were trying to gain scale against Google and Facebook. So newspapers would take on debt and roll up more newspapers to gain scale, and the logic was that that increase in scale and audience would give them enough of a platform to compete. At the end of the day, it didn't. The debt burden created this fixed need for cash flow, which prevented newspapers from evolving their model, and that big evolution was going from printing ads in your newspaper and collecting revenue to a digital subscription.
Austin: If you look at the three big ones that I talked about, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and the Financial Times, they were all purchased by very big, cash-stable businesses that allowed them, unburdened by debt, to navigate this transition to a subscription and away from printing ads in print. Virtually all other newspapers have gone through bankruptcies and all sorts of things, as they had to keep those ads in the newspaper and try to keep that business alive to finance their debt. The downfall of those was that, as they kept trying to keep the old way alive, their revenues declined faster than their debt payments, because they weren't able to pay off debt. It's just a cycle you don't want to get into.
Austin: And Netflix has done the same thing, in a way, with streaming. You used to have studio businesses where the only way you could get content out was to put it in movie theaters, and then it went out over these cable and broadcast bundles. Every country had its own cable and broadcast networks that were effectively the gatekeepers. What Netflix did is allow content to go out over the internet, globally.
Austin: And this created two big problems for the traditional Hollywood studio business. One was that streaming, which we all understand, I don't think there's anybody who hasn't experienced it, is so far superior to flipping through your cable package with all the channels, where you have to pick one, and you don't get to start at the beginning. If you miss the start of it, you're just starting in the middle. If there's something on that you don't want to watch right now, you're kind of limited to that. And cable pays for itself with advertising that typically comes on in the middle of shows and is pretty disruptive. So Netflix came out with this new model that, one, was far superior, but also was global, meaning they could get audiences outside of a specific area and grow their revenue base far above what any traditional broadcast or cable company ever hoped and dreamed they could.
Debt, consolidation and the YouTube threat
Austin: So there's been this massive, massive consolidation effort. I think Disney was a very notable one, because they bought Time Warner. They took on a ton of debt, and I think Disney's moat in their theme parks, and the cash they make off that, gave them the time to navigate and cross over. I think Disney has now reached a place where their streaming businesses can start to carry Disney forward at scale.
Austin: If you look at Paramount and Warner, they have done so many acquisitions over the past decade, trying to get to a point of scale where they could compete with Netflix. And even today, with this last one, I think they've got like $80 billion of debt that Paramount Skydance had to take on to do this merger. Once again, they have two really good streaming businesses: they've got HBO and they've got Paramount. I think the two of them combined have about 200 million subscribers, and they're just at the point where they're starting to break even. But this debt load is a huge anchor. What they're trying to navigate is these legacy businesses, dying but cash-flow-producing, that they're just trying to stretch out over cable and broadband.
Austin: And the big problem that I would be more worried about for Warner and Paramount with this debt load, and this is one of the reasons I was very nervous about Netflix taking on a debt load, is that Netflix and this industry itself are facing a new type of competitor. It's not new, but it's a growing thing, and that's YouTube. All these streaming companies are trying to figure out a way to raise their prices, and here you have a competitor out there that's now 16% of U.S. viewership, of screen time, and they don't have to pay for their content. They've basically got a huge network moat of content creators who put this out for free, so they don't have to charge for it. The content creators and YouTube basically split the pie of advertising or subscription dollars. And really, the decision is: do I want to watch ads or not? If I choose to watch ads, I can watch YouTube for free.
Austin: So as you try to raise your prices, YouTube is, in effect, the piece out there that's going to limit all of these streaming services' ability to raise prices. Now, I don't think we're there yet. If you look across the board at ad plans, you've got Netflix, HBO, Disney and Paramount, who are, I'd say, the big four remaining streamers, all sitting at around $8 to $9 a month for their ad plans. They go up to standard plans, which are in the range of $15 to $19 a month, and then their premium plans, which give you 4K and some different audio settings, are… I think Netflix is at the top at like $27, $28, and HBO's right up in that ballpark.
Austin: So I look at those streaming services, and I look at what a cable bundle costs and what you would pay for cable. All four of them combined, on an ad plan or a standard plan, would still be below what you'd pay today for a cable package. You're looking at upwards of $100-plus a month to add cable onto your internet.
Austin: It does beg the question: is this merger good for Paramount and Warner? I think Paramount is basically saying, "We have to do this to survive." So you have to understand that this wasn't done out of desire because it was the best deal. It was done out of necessity: they see no other way to survive in the future without doing this, and taking on the debt was the only way they could get this over the hurdle, because they don't have the cash flows to do it. That debt was backed by Larry Ellison's ownership stake in Oracle, so there could be all sorts of negative things if Oracle were to experience some massive share price decline. That could create issues. And obviously, if that gets coupled with not being able to pay back their debt, it could force some type of, I'd say long-shot but still possible, bankruptcy. So I don't like that.
Austin: The other thing, the benefit for Netflix, is that it consolidates the industry. People are getting to a point where they don't have as much streaming anxiety. Let's take Prime and YouTube as a little bit separate for now: Prime, you have all the benefits of packages showing up at your house, and YouTube, like I said, you've got creators who are creating their own content and paying for it. For the studios doing streaming, you've got Disney, with Hulu grouped in there. You've got Warner Bros. and all that comes with that: HBO, the Harry Potter universe, things like that. You've got Paramount, which is doing pretty poorly on everything aside from what Taylor Sheridan is putting out. If Taylor Sheridan didn't exist for Paramount, they would have gone under long ago. But man, he is killing it with the content he's putting out, from Lioness to Yellowstone to Landman to Tulsa King. Him by himself is basically keeping all of Paramount alive.
Austin: And then you've got Netflix. So now you don't have that much switching between them. Apple TV is such a distant fifth that I don't even consider it really relevant. They come out with two new seasons that get any traction per year, and people will subscribe and then dump it. So I think the consolidation helps Netflix compete better against YouTube.
Austin: All of this is to say that I'm glad Netflix didn't take on a bunch of debt. I think they missed this last quarter, this half of the year, in terms of content. They've done a reshuffle of creative executives and are trying to bring stuff in, and I think they're acknowledging that they didn't have the right mix of content in the short term, and so the stock price is down off of that. But I think in the long term, a consolidated streaming industry will only benefit them and help them better compete against somebody like YouTube, which is going to be, definitely, no questions asked, the dominant streaming service out there in the future, by a long shot. YouTube will be the winner above all else. I just think that Netflix is number two.
Austin: And if you look at newspapers, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times are all, revenue-wise, at all-time highs today. They successfully navigated a very painful transition that they [unclear: "caused"?]. And I think it's very likely that Netflix, Disney and this new combined Paramount Warner Bros., assuming Paramount Warner Bros. doesn't go bankrupt, will also be a trifecta out there that survives the YouTube free-content attack.
Can Netflix keep making hits?
Phil: I think the biggest challenge I would have back to you on that is that the history of studios coming up with fabulous content is uniformly terrible. They all fail eventually. And Netflix had this idea, or my idea of Netflix, or your idea of Netflix, was that they had data that studios didn't have, and that meant they would produce shows that people wanted to see. And that is not looking real good right now. Their viewership is up like 2% in terms of the amount of hours people are watching, and they may not be producing the content. Like you just said, they're trying to change some of their producers and this and that. But how are they missing, if they have the data that says this is what people want to watch? It's very straightforward: "Oh, OK, now we know what to make." And then they don't make it. What's wrong with the thesis, is what I'm wondering. Is that thesis holding, or are they just another studio with some really nice ideas about how to produce content people want to see that turn out not to be true?
Austin: You know, I really want to keep politics out of this discussion. But from what I've read and heard in the—
Phil: I don't know how you keep politics out of it if you voted blue. I just don't know how you—
Austin: Well, the positive is that if I'm a lifelong Republican and I switch to being a communist, I don't have to change the color of my wardrobe. Red works both ways. OK, so—
Travis: I see you're wearing your red today.
Austin: Yeah. This is not my Republican red. This is my communist red. And I didn't want to bring it up, Phil, but I read this really good book on investing before I came in. If anybody wants to read my favorite book on investing, here you go, everybody. It's really influencing… the Communist Manifesto, right now. [Austin holds up a copy of "The Communist Manifesto."] Election, you know. [laughter]
Travis: Cat's out of the bag. Cat's out of the bag.
Austin: OK, but let me address this point, because there was a big let-go at Netflix, and a big central point of that let-go, and I think Disney has been plagued by this, was that there was this huge push, despite having an algorithm that shows what people want, toward diversity across writing groups and actors in movies, and in terms of the roles that should be taken. There was this huge diversity push that's lasted for about four or five years. And I think that is having an impact in terms of a divide.
Austin: When we just say "DEI," I think it's very clear that there's a lot of this country that hears the word DEI and falls on one side or the other, whether they support it or not, even though it's this huge, wide range of issues. I think a lot of people who support DEI don't support everything that is DEI, and I think a lot of people who are against DEI would look at some things and say, "Yeah, that's a good thing." So we just get painted into black and white.
Austin: But the person at the top of their creative who was let go, before the guy who's being brought in, was holding studios and writers and actors… not to affirm "you have to do this," like Disney was, but they were publishing, like, "Hey, you're not meeting diversity guidelines." And if you've got studios that want creative freedom, and directors that want creative freedom to do stuff, I think that has a big impact.
Austin: If you go back four or five years, one of the areas where Netflix won so much was that they stayed out of making those decisions. They would send money into areas where their algorithms were saying content mattered. That's where Squid Game came out of: the algorithms were saying that anything that has to do with social injustice is what people want. And boom, they've got some director in South Korea with a show about wealthy people pitting poor people against each other in a game, that nobody in South Korea or any other studio wants to touch, and they can buy it for absolute pennies on the dollar, and it turns into one of the most-watched shows ever, Squid Game. That's the algorithm working at its best pace.
Austin: And I've heard people like the director who made "300" come in and just say that when he came to work for Netflix, they said, "Hey, here's a check. Do what you want." And that is something that directors want. So I think Netflix made a really big mistake, which was trying to, not enforce, but basically push directors in a certain direction, which puts them right up against everybody else who's doing potentially the right thing or the wrong thing, instead of just letting artists be artists.
Austin: The guy that's coming in was let go from Disney because he was so against this exact thing. Bob Chapek basically fired him. I think he was likely to come in and replace Chapek, who was failing, and obviously Bob Iger ultimately came in, about six months after Bob fired this guy, and replaced Bob. So this guy's going back to "let directors and creatives just do what the heck they want to do," which is how you get some of the best content that's ever been created: just letting an artist be an artist, and not trying to come in over the top and say, "This is a great story and a great campaign, but man, it'd be really good if you could go back to your writing team and make sure there's an equal number of diverse cast in the writing room."
Phil: So let me ask you something. How do you square the algorithm that tells you what to make with director freedom?
Austin: The algorithm isn't necessarily telling the director what to make. It's telling you what director and what story you want to fund, but then it lets the directors do all the creative themselves. Does that make sense?
Phil: Well, I understand the algorithm is basically supposed to tell you what I want to see.
Austin: Right. Right.
Phil: So how does that translate into "let the directors do whatever the hell they want"?
Austin: Yeah. So that comes down to: OK, we know what people want to see, so now we're going to allocate dollars toward all the stories that match that. You go out into the world of directors and creatives and artists, and you try to find all of the content that either has already been created, in the case of Squid Game, or stories that you want to get behind, and you fund those stories. So you're basically going out and finding the content that people want to see, in mass quantity. You're not going to just hit a one-off. You've got to go for 500 different ideas and hope that one of them in this direction is the one that pops off. That's the Netflix strategy.
Austin: The problem you get is when you say, "OK, we need to go support 500," you bring them in, and you say, "OK, we're funding you, but now here are the tweaks that we want you to make to fit our diversity model, our DEI model." And I'm not saying that the initiative itself is bad. I'm not trying to say that having a diverse cast or anything is bad. But I think you can really mess up your creative freedom.
Austin: Think of the movie "300." I just want to use that as an example. With Zack Snyder, what made "300" an epic scene was that there were 300 insanely jacked, muscular men fighting. It wouldn't have landed the same way if you'd put anybody else in the world in there who didn't fit that mold, right?
Austin: OK. But that movie wasn't diverse at all. [laughter] Yeah. No diversity whatsoever in that movie. It was basically just 300 completely jacked men out there fighting a war.
Phil: So let's say you've got the Rocky script floating around. You've got Sylvester Stallone, who won't let somebody else be the lead, and people recognize there's a huge risk going on with all that, but the algorithm is saying people really want that kind of a movie, right? So what you're basically saying is Netflix would be the place to go if you're Stallone today, and they would conceivably say, "Yeah, we've got a slot for that. Go for it." So he basically has the freedom to make the movie he wants to make, but not the freedom to make Netflix accept that particular script. They're going to decide based on what their algorithm says. OK, I think I understand that. That makes sense.
Phil: That makes sense. And if they do start screwing with DEI, or whatever restrictions a producer wants to put on it… Hollywood is so rife… I'm completely agreeing with you here. Hollywood is so rife with horror stories of really great directors being interfered with by producers who have a vision, but they're not artists. They just have this idea that they're going to change this movie this way, and they've turned great ideas from some of the greatest directors ever in the business into a piece of crap. So yeah, I got you. I think you're making sense.
Austin: Yeah. And I have nothing against it if a director wants to. I think it's just trying to enforce it that's where things go wrong. And YouTube doesn't have any of these anchors. YouTube is incredibly diverse, but it's not because they're enforcing diversity. It's just because the best content and the best ideas rise to the top and win.
Phil: Yeah, that's rich.
Austin: Completely absent of a thumb on the scale.
Travis: The one thing I think is sort of interesting about this as well: when I was looking at this, I was looking at it from the live sports perspective. It was one little niche that I thought was interesting, since Netflix has been making a bit of a push into this area. And you look at, is it TNT, and what's the other one that came in with the Time Warner merger? I think they've got a nice position in live sports, and it'll be interesting to see how Netflix responds to that, if they're really serious about pushing into live events. But I think they're going to have a really hard time integrating these two big businesses. It's going to take years for that integration to happen, and to your point earlier, they've got to clear that debt. So I don't think this has a direct, immediate impact on Netflix. We'll see how this plays out over the next couple of years.
Netflix's valuation and a changing investor base
Phil: Well, then, on that point: right now, Netflix is selling for what, 60-some? I keep looking at where we're at in terms of where we would be buying more.
Phil: It's really getting down there, where it's starting to get pretty interesting. When I start running numbers on it, at current estimates of the growth rate, which I'm going to say are a very rough approximation, with the P/E ratio running at 19, I'm going to say that Mr. Market is basically saying this is a 9% grower, effectively, today. And I think that's just not right. I don't think that's going to be the case. They're actually growing at almost 14%. And I think at a 14% growth rate and a 28 P/E, they're going to be worth every bit of a hundred bucks, I think, for sure.
Austin: There was also something right at the beginning, Hunter, that you mentioned, which I think is a challenge for Netflix right now. You said that people are used to Netflix being a cash flow business, and I don't think investors are actually used to Netflix being a cash flow business, because they so recently turned into a massive cash flow business. They're used to it being a growth business. So there's this transition going on, where you've got an investor base that's used to the Steve Jobs Apple, and now Netflix is potentially transitioning into the Tim Cook version of Apple.
Austin: So we're going to see people who are only focused on topline subscriber and revenue growth, and they might leave Netflix if it doesn't maintain that high-teens level of growth into the future. And you're going to get an entirely different class of investors that come in and are looking at a gigantic amount of free cash flow, huge buybacks and no debt, and at what that type of investment can do. Warren Buffett's entire investment in Apple has been centered around that transition, out of Steve Jobs and high growth and into huge free cash flow, buybacks and dividends, which can make a really wonderful investment for the long run.
Travis: And I would argue, to that point, that it's not even so much a management transition as a natural transition of a business from early growth to a more mature growth phase of its life cycle, right? They spend all this money up front to build out the distribution network, the content, the core of their business, and at some stage they don't have to invest as much. So they start moving more of it to free cash flow, and now they've built their moat and they're a cash flow machine. I think this happens with a lot of businesses. We saw that with Apple, and I think this is a great example of what we're seeing. That was exactly the point I wanted to make: you're seeing a changing of the investor class in Netflix. People who really care about free cash flow and a mature business are a different kind of investor than it attracted when it was growing earnings at a really high rate and not getting a lot of money to free cash flow.
Hunter: Yeah, it'd be interesting. We all follow Michael Burry. He had an interesting thought on this, which was basically looking at the sum of the volume traded on a stock over a period of time. His idea was that when that total volume exceeded the number of shares outstanding by about 4x, it usually meant there was a whole new class of investor in the business. I think that was roughly what his numbers were; don't quote me on that, but you guys should go check out his Substack, which is really, really interesting. He talked about it in there.
Hunter: That'd be something really interesting to look at here with Netflix. We have a couple of these instances where businesses are transitioning from big growth machines into more of a cash cow. And when you get that new investor class in there that's willing to just enjoy the return on their capital and hold the business for a long time, instead of selling it off and driving the price down, maybe it's a little bit of an indicator. Not that we're in the business of trying to time or guess where the bottom is, but it's a little bit of an indicator of where that might be. So that'd be interesting to look into for Netflix, for sure.
Phil: Yeah. Well, if you brought up Burry, I've got to say: isn't Burry's view of Netflix, how did he put it, that Disney produces wine and Netflix produces milk? Isn't that Burry? [laughter] You keep the wine in the cellar, it gets more valuable. You put the milk in the cellar…
Hunter: It makes cheese. [laughter]
Phil: I think he agrees with us, actually, that a good buy price would probably be 50. But that has to overcome this idea that Netflix has to keep producing milk over and over again. And of course this is the big challenge we've been talking about here for the last half hour: can they? And we think they can.
Austin: I do agree on some level with Burry on that. Let's not take any of the recent Disney stuff, because they're just bombing on so much stuff right now, but you look at the original Star Wars, or their Marvel superhero movie lineup, the Avengers series and all the Spider-Man and Iron Man: those are going to continue to be watched by kids for decades to come, guaranteed. Those are going to retain value well into the future. And I think the counter to that is something like Peaky Blinders on Netflix, or Bridgerton. Is that going to hold its value well into the future?
Austin: I think on some level, for new subscribers, it will, but I don't think it's going to come close to the value that something like Star Wars or The Avengers has long term. So yeah, you're right. Netflix does have to keep figuring out what the next thing is, because I think things like Peaky Blinders or Bridgerton or Stranger Things lose that broad appeal as soon as there's no current cultural relevance associated with them. Your kids don't need cultural relevance to know they want to watch Iron Man. But people that watch Bridgerton might not be so into it if there's not a lot of it being talked about out there in the world. So yeah, I do agree with you there.
Hunter: It's a numbers thing. Who's producing more content than Netflix, though? Except for YouTube, right? We've got to put YouTube in a different category, of course. But when me and Alexis sit down and want to watch something and don't know what we want to watch, we turn Netflix on, because they have new content constantly. But we might read about one of our favorite shows on one of these other platforms coming out with a new season, and we're going to go turn it on there, because we're more interested, generally speaking. So I think that's kind of the summation of what you're trying to say, right? Geez, you cannot match the amount of content that they're making, but it remains to be seen if it's going to continue to be culturally relevant for a long time, like some of these other platforms' content.
Buybacks and sticking to the core business
Phil: I think, Trav, you just nailed a great reason to own a great company, and that is that as it goes through its life cycle, if you buy it right, at a great price, when it starts growing at 10% instead of 20%, the chances are good, if it's a solid business model, that it's going to get to cash flow. And the cash flow has to go somewhere, and where it's going to go, for more and more companies, is supporting the earnings-per-share price, because that's where the executives get paid. So they're just going to buy back stock and buy back stock and buy back stock. And the big advantage for the investor is that you're not paying taxes on dividends.
Austin: Yeah.
Phil: And over time, you end up owning a huge piece of this thing. So—
Austin: And I would so much rather them do that than try to go into gaming or something. They've got all these little fingers in little things, and I just feel like this is one of the biggest mistakes that executives and companies make. Tim Cook did not make this mistake. He realized that you can create a wonderful investment for your investors by not trying to get out of your core thing, and just returning money to shareholders when you're producing huge cash flow, as long as you stay relevant enough that a future product doesn't take you out of relevancy. If Tim Cook sees a threat to the iPhone, he needs to act on that. But outside of a threat to the iPhone, which right now I don't really see, he doesn't need to get into autonomous vehicles or something like that to keep the returns up. He can just keep returning that iPhone cash flow right back to investors, and it can be really, really wonderful for investors over the long term.
Austin: This is Ross Stores at its finest. They basically just grew their store base at like 5% per year and returned all the money they made to shareholders through dividends and buybacks. Had you bought Ross Stores 27 years ago, your investment would be up 120x: your $10,000 would have become $1.2 million, 25 years later. And they did absolutely nothing other than stick to their core business and continue to grow stores at a moderate pace.
Phil: Look what Elliott's doing at [unclear: "Align"?]. I think it's just so fascinating. They're looking at a company that's struggling to grow at all, and realizing that management teams are highly incentivized to keep their jobs. So they're going to tell the board all these wonderful things they're doing, which tend to revolve around acquiring other companies, acquiring other technologies, R&D out of left field: spend the cash flow, right? That's the idea of management: "Spend the cash flow and let's get this baby going." And Elliott comes into [unclear: "Align"?] and just goes, "No. You can spend the cash flow on continuing to develop the product line, but that's it. No more left-field R&D. No more acquisitions. No more anything. We're putting handcuffs on you, because we want you buying back stock with all that cash flow."
Phil: And it's just smart. It's saying where the investor differs from a management team. The owner has a different incentive than a manager, absolutely.
Austin: Yeah.
Phil: So let's just keep in mind that good companies that are managed well are going to allocate capital properly, and companies that are managed badly allocate capital in stupid ways and evaporate the equity of the business.
Wrap-up
Hunter: Well, good discussion there on Netflix, for sure. Really, really interesting stuff, and a company we're definitely keeping an eye on for a couple different reasons. But with that, I think we're probably running up against time, guys. So let's push the discussion about Vertiv to next week; we'll discuss Vertiv then. So thank you to everybody for listening to this week's episode of the Rule One Podcast. For Phil, Austin, Travis and myself, we will catch you guys next week.
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